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INTRODUCrION

Within the ranks of attorneys in the United States, government
attorneys hold a unique position. Because they have obligations to
both the government they serve and the professional rules of legal
ethics,' government attorneys sometimes have to confront conflicts
between the interests of government clients and the ethical standards
which they as members of the bar vow to uphold.2 The importance of
government attorneys has increased as courts and administrative agencies have gained policy-making authority over what was once the traditional domain of the legislature.3 Included among almost 40,000
federal government lawyers 4 are lawyers employed by Congress, the
federal courts, and the executive branch. 5
The unique role of government attorneys in the American legal
system has come into a sharp focus by the recent investigation into
President and Mrs. Clinton's involvement in a series of Arkansas real
6
estate transactions (collectively known as the "Whitewater" affair).
1 SeeJOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & RicHARD W. PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 237 (1997); C. Normand Poirier, The FederalGovernment Lawyer and ProfessionalEthics, 60 A.BA J. 1541, 1541 (1974); see also Jennifer Wang, Note,
Raising the Stakes at the White House: Legal and EthicalDuties of the White House Counse 8 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHics 115, 131 (1994) (noting that members of the White House Counsel are
"subject to the code of ethics of the state bar of which they are members").
2 See generally NOONAN & PAINTER, supra note 1, at 237-43 (discussing the duties, clients, conflicting loyalties, and conflicts of interests of government lawyers).
3 See Cornell W. Clayton, Introduction: Politics and the Legal Bureaucracy, in GovERNMENT LAWYERs: THE FEDERAL LEGAL BuREAucRAcY AND PRESIDENTIAL PoLrrlcs 1, 1 (Cornell
W. Clayton ed., 1995) [hereinafter GovERNmENT LAwYERs]; see also Alan B. Morrison, The
AdministrativeProcedureAct: A Living and Responsive Law, 72 VA. L. REv. 253, 254-60 (1986)

(noting the increase in rulemaking by administrative agencies). Policy areas that have seen
an increase in the importance of government attorneys include civil rights, environmental
protection, and entitlement programs. See Clayton, supra, at 1. The number of government lawyers is increasing, and is likely to continue to do so. See MARK C. MIL.LER, THE
HIGH PREsTs OF AMERICAN PoLiTcs: THE ROLE OF LAWvERs IN AMERICAN PoLrnITAL INSTITUTIONS 37 (1995).
4 See Clayton, supra note 3, at 1. Approximately 15% of all lawyers in the United

States work for some governmental entity. See MILLER,supra note 3, at 37;
JUDGES AND LAWvYRS: THE HUMAN SIDE OFJUsTIcE 78 (1991).
5 See NOONAN & PAINTER, supra note 1, at 237; Clayton,

PAUL WICF,

supra note 3, at 1.
6 For a detailed history of the Whitewater investigation, see United States v. Tucker,
78 F.3d 1313 (8th Cir. 1996). The Whitewater investigation has received wide coverage in
the popular press. See Paul Greenberg, Arkansasfrom Afar and Down Home, COM. APPEAL
(Memphis), Apr. 5, 1996, at A7 (reporting that Whitewater has received "national press
coverage"); cf. Clinton Could Face Reversal ofFortune, ADvOCATE (Baton Rouge), Feb. 10,
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From the Whitewater investigation emerged two federal court of appeals decisions that concern issues pertinent to government attorneys.
Both the Eighth Circuit's 1997 decision in In re GrandJury Subpoena
8 conDuces Tecum7 and the D.C. Circuit's 1998 decision in In reLindsey
fronted the issue of whether an attorney who works for the federal
government may invoke the attorney-client privilege as a reason for
noncompliance with a federal grand jury subpoena.9 Both circuits
held in two-to-one decisions that federal government attorneys may
not invoke the attorney-client privilege against disclosure to a federal
grand jury.'0 Although the lapse of the Independent Counsel Statute
eliminates much of the factual predicate for these decisions, the question of the proper scope of the government attorney-client privilege
remains.
In re Lindsey and In re GrandJury SubpoenaDuces Tecum are interesting cases for several reasons. First, from the perspective of the government attorney, these cases represent a dispute between two sets of
government attorneys-the Office of the Independent Counsel and
the White House Counsel's Office." In addition, these cases are important because testimonial privileges have been the subject of recent
1997, at 8B (arguing that the public is not interested in Whitewater "despite considerable
press coverage"); Alexander Cockburn & Jeffrey St. Clair, Is Hillary a Crook?, NEv STATESMAN & Soc'Y, Apr. 12, 1996, at 20, 20 (arguing that public perception of Whitewater comes
from "the consensus of the media").
7 112 F.3d 910 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
8
148 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 158 F.3d 1263
(D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
9 See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1102; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112
F.3d at 915. This issue was one of first impression for both courts. See 112 F.3d at 918
("Lacking persuasive direction in the case law, we turn to general principles."); Government
Lawyers Aren't Shielded From GrandJuries, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 17, 1998, at B25 (noting that the
D.C. Circuit addressed the question of first impression). The D.C. Circuit's opinion considered only the government attorney-client privilege issue. See 148 F.3d at 1102. The
Eighth Circuit's opinion addressed several additional issues as follows: whether the presence of private attorneys at meetings with government attorneys affects the government
attorney-client privilege, see 112 F.3d at 921-23; whether a client's reasonable belief that
communications are privileged is sufficient to make such communications privileged, see
id. at 923-24; whether the work product doctrine is applicable to work prepared in anticipation of congressional hearings, see id.at 924-25; and whether a new legal rule applies to the
parties in a case of first impression, see id. at 925. These issues are beyond the scope of this
Note.
1O See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1102; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112
F.3d at 915; see also Harvey Berkman, Lindsey RulingImpact: Outsourcing,NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10,
1998, at A12 (reporting that the D.C. Circuit opinion was the second ruling by a court of
appeals rejecting the government attorney-client privilege in the context of federal grand
jury subpoenas); Joan Biskupic, CourtLets Stand Rulings on Secret Service, Lawyers' Testimony,
WAsH. PoSr, Nov. 10, 1998, at A4 (reporting the Supreme Court decision not to hear "a
pair of lower court decisions that said ... the president's talks with White House lawyers
are not bound by the traditional attorney-client secrecy").
11 This situation where two different entities of the federal government are on opposing sides of a suit in federal court is not surprising given the sheer number of government
attorneys and the number of interests the federal government represents. See Michael
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debate. 12 Finally, the decision to limit the availability of the government attorney-client privilege in the context of federal grand jury proceedings represents a radical departure from the previously
unqualified rule that the attorney-client privilege absolutely protects
communications between government employees and government
3
attorneys.'
It may appear easy to dismiss these two decisions as dependent on
the Independent Counsel Statute, but the decisions concern an area
of privilege law that lacks precedent. 14 Because they were cases of first
impression for both the Eighth and D.C. Circuits, any critical analysis
of the decisions must examine situations and principles of law analogous to those discussed in these cases. 15 One must, for instance, consider the practical consequence that limiting the government
attorney-client privilege has on the work of government attorneys and
the interests of government clients.

Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself'?, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 893, 895, 907-08 (1991).
12 See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, _ 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2083
(1998) (holding that attorney-client privilege survives the client's death); In re Sealed Case,
148 F.3d 1073, 1079 (D.C. Cir.) (refusing to recognize the "protective function privilege"
of Secret Service), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998); Jonathan Rose, Note, E-Mail Security
Risks: Taking Hacks at the Attorney-Client Privilege, 23 RUTGERS CoMPtrrE & TECH. LJ.179

(1997) (discussing the attorney-client privilege in the context of the security of on-line
communication between lawyers and clients); see alsoJames Toedtman, Succesors May Feel
Clinton's Pain: Rulings on Oval Office PrivilegesSeen as Costly to FuturePresidents,AusrN'r AM.STATESMAN, Aug. 9, 1998, at GI ("In the six-month investigation of his relationship with
[Monica] Lewinsky, Clinton has waged losing battles in asserting [the] lawyer-client privilege, executive privilege and a special protective privilege covering Secret Service agents.").
13 See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text; see also Abbe David Lowell, LawyerClient PrivilegeIs Absolute, NAT'L L.J., May 26, 1997, at A21 (noting that the Eighth Circuit
"has literally invented an exception to the attorney-client privilege for conversations between government attorneys and officials in response to investigations that might involve
criminal law issues").
14 See Lance Cole, The Government-ClientPrivilegeAfter Office of the President v. Office
of the Independent Counsel, 22J. LEGAL PROF. 15, 17 (1997-1998) ("[T]he holding in In re
GrandJury Subpoena... creates uncertainty regarding the application of the attorney-client
privilege to government lawyers ....[T]he decision calls into question whether government lawyers can ever assert the privilege in response to a governmental investigation or
inquiry."); cf Office of President v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 524 U.S. 399, - 119 S.Ct.
466, 466 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.) ("[T]he question presented by
this petition has no clear legal answer and is open to serious legal debate.").
15 The Eighth Circuit based its decision on general legal principles because it found
no binding statutes or case law. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at
918; Marcia Coyle, PrivilegeRuling Could Touch All Gov't Attorneys: Whitewater Case Withholds
Right That Corporate Clients Have Long Enjoyed, NAT"L L.J., May 19, 1997, at Al (noting in
reference to In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum that "[t ] he [Eighth Circuit] found little
case law on whether a government attorney-client privilege can be asserted in federal
grand jury proceedings"). The D.C. Circuit similarly had little precedent on which to rely.
Seeln re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1108 ("In the instant case,. . . there is no such existing body of

caselaw upon which to rely....").
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This Note argues that a blanket prohibition on the application of
the attorney-client privilege to a government attorney representing a
government client-who is or could be served with a federal grand
jury subpoena-is unsound. The privilege is important for government clients because, like private clients, they need the candid legal
advice that only the attorney-client privilege can guarantee. The prohibition on this privilege is especially unwise when the government
client at issue is the President. Part I analyzes the scope of and justifications for the attorney-client privilege. Part II examines the background and the majority and dissenting opinions of both In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum and In re Lindsey. Part I argues that the
attorney-client privilege is necessary for government attorneys and
government clients in the context of grand jury investigations. Part IV
considers an alternative to the limitation by the Eighth and D.C. Circuits on the government attorney-client privilege; it proposes two tests
to inform any future construction of the privilege. This Part considers
the proper scope of the government attorney-client privilege in a postIndependent Counsel legal environment. Finally, this Note concludes
that these two decisions place government attorneys in a difficult position by setting an unfortunate precedent for future use of the government attorney-client privilege.
I
THE ATroRNEY-CLmNT PRyvILtGE

This Part is intended as a brief introduction to the attorney-client
privilege. It will examine the contours of the attorney-client privilege,
analyze the reasons behind courts' recognition of the privilege, and
discuss limitations placed on the privilege.
A.

Definitions of the Attorney-Client Privilege

Many attempts have been made to craft a precise definition of the
attorney-client privilege. 16 John Henry Wigmore devised the most
popular definition, 17 which states that
(1) [w]here legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications
relevant to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by
16 See Casey Nix, Note, In re Sealed Case: The Attorney-Client Privilege-TillDeath Do Us
Part?,43 Vii. L. RFv. 285, 286 (1998) ("The exact scope of the [attorney-client] privilege
...has recently become the focus of heated scholarly debate.").
17 For examples of circuits that use the Wigmore formulation of the attorney-client
privilege, see United States v. White, 970 F.2d 328, 334 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Rockwell Int'l, 897 F.2d 1255, 1264 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437,
1441 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 n.9 (5th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
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himself or 18by the legal adviser, (8) except the client waives the
protection.
Despite numerous attempts at definition, the exact scope of the
attorney-client privilege remains debatable.' 9 The Federal Rules of
Evidence permit the scope of the privilege to be flexibly circumscribed according to evolving common law principles. 20 Rule 501 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence states that "the privilege of a witness,
person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience." 2 ' The language of Rule 501 suggests that the scope of
22
the attorney-client privilege should evolve over time.
18

4JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COM-

§ 2292 (1905) (typeface altered). Judge Wyzanski offered another often cited
formulation of the attorney-client privilege in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89
F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950). He said the privilege applies where the following conditions
MON LAW

are met:

(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client;
(2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of

the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of
which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence
of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion
on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and
not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege
has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
Id. at 358-59.
19 See 1 SCOTT N. STONE & ROBERT K TAYLOR, TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 1.02, at 1-8 to
1-9 (2d ed. 1995).
20 Local professional ethics rules do not alter the federal common law attorney-client
privilege as the federal courts apply it. See Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d 351,355 (6th Cir. 1998)
("Questions of privilege are to be determined by federal common law in federal question
cases."); United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 877 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Congress cannot have
intended to allow local rules... to carve out fifty different privileged exemptions to the ...
requirements of [a federal law].").
21 FED. R. EVID. 501. Rule 501 applies to federal criminal cases and most civil cases
involving nondiverse parties in federal court. See I STONE & TAYLOR, supra note 19, § 1.03,
at 1-10. Although the Federal Rules of Evidence are generally suspended in grand jury
investigations, see FED. R. EVID. 1101 (d) (2), this does not reduce the protection afforded by
the attorney-client privilege, since the federal evidence rules governing privileges do apply
to grand jury proceedings, see FED. R. EvID. 1101(c). Despite the grandjury's broad investigatory powers, see, e.g., United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) ("The
function of the grand jury is to inquire into all information that might possibly bear on its
investigation until it has identified an offense or has satisfied itself that none has occurred."), grand juries may not inquire into privileged communications, see 1 STONE &
TAYLOR, supra note 19, § 1.75, at 1-204.
22 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) ("The Federal Rules of Evidence acknowledge the authority of the federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges .... ."); GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 501.1,
at 195 (3d ed. 1998) ("Rule 501 reserves the matter of privileges to the common law and
statutes for determination, interpretation and development.").
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The evolution of the attorney-client privilege via case law led to
the drafting of Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503 ("Proposed
Rule 503"). Under Proposed Rule 503,
[a] client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any
other person from disclosing confidential communications made
for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal
services to the client, (1) between himself or his representative and
his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, or (2) between his lawyer
and the lawyer's representative, or (3) by him or his lawyer to a
lawyer representing another in a matter of common interest, or (4)
between representatives of the client or between the client and a
representative of the client, or (5) between lawyers representing the
client.

23

Although Congress never formally enacted Proposed Rule 503 into
law, federal courts have cited it as an accurate reflection of the federal
24
common law formulation of the attorney-client privilege.
B. Justifications for the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest federal testimonial privilege.2 5 As the Supreme Court has noted, the law traditionally has
exempted confidential discussions between lawyer and client from disclosure "to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in
23
FED. R. EvID. 503(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1972), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. 183, 236
(U.S. 1972).
24
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997); In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929, 935 (8th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 751 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Spector, 793 F.2d 932,
938 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[C]ourts have relied upon [Proposed Rule 503] as an accurate definition of the federal common law of attorney-client privilege.. . ."); 3JACK B. WErNSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 503.02, at 503-10 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1999) (noting that although Congress struck down Proposed Rule
503, "it has considerable utility as a guide to the federal common law"). Proposed Rule
503 acknowledges that the protection of the attorney-client privilege may cover government attorneys and clients. The Rule defines "client" to mean "a person, public officer, or
corporation, association, or other organization or entity, either public or private." FED. R.
EVID. 503(a) (1) (Proposed Official Draft 1972), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. at 235.
25
See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, _ 118 S.Ct 2081, 2084
(1998) ("The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications." (citations omitted)); United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237,
243 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[T]he rule affording confidentiality to communications between attorney and client endures as the oldest rule of privilege known to the common law."); 4
WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 2290, at 319-94 (noting that the attorney-client privilege is the
oldest privilege at common law); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Privilegesand Professionals:Lawyers
and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REv. 597, 603 (1980) ("[Tlhe attorney-client privilege is the
oldest and most widely recognized privilege."). For a detailed history of the attorney-client
privilege, see David Drysdale, History of the Attorney-Client Privilege, in PAUL 1-RICE, AroRNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNrrED STATES §§ 1:1-1:13, at 1, 1-43 (1993).
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the observance of law and administration ofjustice." 26 Proponents of
the attorney-client privilege believe that it improves the quality of the
communications between lawyer and client and therefore improves
the quality of the legal advice clients receive. 27 If clients hesitate to
speak openly with their attorneys, lawyers cannot accurately inform
clients of their legal obligations and advise them of the best way to
meet those obligations.2 8 This law compliance function, the Supreme
29
Court has said, serves the public's interest.
Although one generally assumes that the attorney-client privilege
reduces the amount of information available to a court,30 there is support for the contrary proposition that the attorney-client privilege actually preserves some information that would be lost absent the
26 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); see also Swddler & Berlin, 524
U.S. at____ 118 S. Ct. at 2086 ("[Tlhe loss of evidence admittedly caused by the privilege
is justified in part by the fact that without the privilege, the client may not have made such
communications in the first place."); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub,
471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985) ("[T]he attorney-client privilege serves the function of promoting
full and frank communications between attorneys and their clients. It thereby encourages
observance of the law and aids in the administration ofjustice."); Coastal States Gas Corp.
v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[T]he privilege reflects
society's judgment that promotion of trust and honesty... is more important than the
burden placed on the discovery of truth."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 4-1 (1981) ("A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a
lawyer must be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client.");
Nancy Horton Burke, The Priceof Cooperatingwith the Government: Possible Waiver of AttorneyClient and Work Product Privileges,49 BAYLOR L. REv. 33, 36-37 (1997) ("The attorney-client
privilege is designed to promote full and complete disclosure between counsel and the
client."); Saltzburg, supra note 25, at 603 n.14 ("If... counsel assists a defendant and also
discloses confidential communications to a court ... clients would seek advice but would
be reluctant to open up fully with counsel.").
27 See Stephen A. Saltzburg, CommunicationsFalling Within the Attorney-Client Privilege,
66 IowA L. REv. 811, 817 (1981); cf.EDNA.SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATroRNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
AND THE WORK-PRODUCr DocriNE 2 (3d ed. 1997) (noting that "the American Bar Association's Task Force on Legal Ethics has suggested that the name of the privilege should be
changed to the 'client-lawyer' privilege to reflect more accurately the primacy of roles").
28 See EpsrEIN, supra note 27, at 6 ("A... policy rationale for the privilege is that by

promoting a client's freedom of consultation with a lawyer, the privilege is said to foster
voluntary compliancewith regulatory laws and thereby facilitate the effective administration
of the laws." (emphasis added)). The Model Code of Professional Conduct also supports
this position: "Almost without exception, clients come to lawyers... to determine what
their rights are and what is, in the maze of laws and regulations, deemed to be legal and
correct.... Based upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice
given, and the law is upheld." MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.6 cmt. 3
(1998); see also Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 691 (10th Cir. 1968) (noting that the attorney-client privilege promotes the administration of justice by encouraging communications between lawyers and clients).
29 See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 ("The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or
advocacy serves public ends. .. ").
30 See 1 KENNET S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 314 (John William Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (noting "[t]he consequent loss to justice of the power to
bring all pertinent facts before the court").
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privilege.3 1 The privilege encourages discussion between an attorney
and a client and thereby prevents the loss of information due to the
client's fading memory as the time gap between the relevant event
and trial increases. 32 This preservation of information aids the court
in its search for truth. 33 Additionally, after a lawyer informs a client
that conversations are privileged, the client will not refrain from discussing sensitive and potentially damaging subjects with her attorney
for the fear that the discussion will be used against her in court.34 In
sum, the attorney-client privilege allows a lawyer to give high quality
legal advice while depriving a court of little information; the client
would not necessarily have divulged the information to the court ab35
sent the protection offered by the attorney-client privilege.
C.

Limitations on the Attomey-Client Privilege

Despite the values protected by the attorney-client privilege, the
privilege is limited in scope. Because the privilege permits attorneys
to exclude information which may help a court in its inquiry, the privilege functions as an exception to the general right of the public to
people's evidence.3 6 Even when the elements that give rise to a testi31
See Petitioner's Reply Brief at 4, Swidler & Berlin (No. 97-1192). Petitioners in Swidler & Berlin argued:
Once the client has freely confided in the lawyer, the lawyer can... prod
the client into testing personal recollections against available documents
and the statements of others. After that process, the lawyer will have an
accurate basis for giving advice, and the client will be better equipped to
present a cogent, truthful account, if testimony is required.
Id.
32
See Saltzburg, supra note 25, at 610-11; cf., e.g., Houghton v. State, 207 N.W.2d 63,
64 (Minn. 1973) (per curiam) (noting that a more expeditious grant of new trials in criminal cases is warranted "so that a second trial... can be had before memories fade" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
33 Cf. Ronald I. Keller, Note, The Applicability and Scape of the Attorney-Client Privilege in
the Executive Branch of the FederalGovernmen4 62 B.U. L. REv. 1003, 1007 (1982) ("The truthseeking apparatus of the adversarial process is impaired by granting litigants [the attorneyclient] privilege. Yet because the privilege serves to improve the quality of legal representation, there is a greater chance that a court will reach a just decision." (footnote
omitted)).
34 See Saltzburg, supra note 25, at 606-07; see also Vela v. Superior Court, 255 Cal. Rptr.

921, 924 (Ct. App. 1989) (noting that the objective of the privilege is to encourage disclosure of information by client to attorney by removing any fear of later disclosure of that
information by the attorney).
35
See Saltzburg, supra note 27, at 817; see also David S. Rudolf & Thomas K. Maher,
Behind Closed Doors, CHAMPION, Aug. 1997, at 40, 41 ("A client unprotected by the privilege
simply will not share the information with counsel, and there will be no greater disclosure
that [sic] there would have been absent the privilege.").
36 See, e.g., University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (noting that
"[i]nasmuch as ... privileges contravene the fundamental principle that the public.., has
a right to every man's evidence .... any such privilege must be strictly construed" (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50
(1980) (same); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 1973) (arguing for the strict construction of the attorney-client privilege and quoting 8 WMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2192, 2291
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monial privilege exist, courts nonetheless strictly construe the scope
of that privilege.3 7 Courts recognize privileges only because they serve
specific purposes which courts believe outweigh the value of the testimony that would be introduced absent the privilege.38
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(d) details only five exceptions to the attorney-client privilege. No privilege exists when (1) discussions between attorney and client are intended to help a client to
commit a crime or fraud,3 9 (2) multiple parties have claims through a
common deceased client, 40 (3) the attorney-client communications at
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)); EPSTEIN, supra note 27, at 12 (discussing strict construction
of the attorney-client privilege).
37 See United States v. Wilson, 960 F.2d 48, 50 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Because evidentiary
privileges impede the fact-finding function by excluding relevant evidence, federal courts
generally disfavor privileges and construe them narrowly."); Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1977) ("[T]he adverse effect of the application [of the
attorney-client privilege] on the disclosure of truth may be such that the privilege is strictly
construed."); Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pa. House Group, Inc., 116
F.R.D. 46, 49 (M.D.N.C. 1987) ("[T]he privilege mustbe strictly construed to ensure that it
does not unduly impinge on the more general, overriding duty of insisting that investigations and decisions be based on truth and reality as opposed to fiction or fabrication."); 4
WIGMoRE, supra note 18, § 2291, at 3204 (arguing that the attorney-client privilege "ought
to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its
principle."); cf.United States v. Murphy, 65 F.3d 758, 761 (9th Cir. 1995) ("We recognize a
marital communications privilege, but construe it narrowly because it obstructs the truthfinding process.").
38 See Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 862 (D.C. Cir.
1980); see also United States v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (listing four factors
to determine whether to recognize a testimonial privilege: (1) the "federal government's
need for information being sought in enforcing its substantive and procedural policies,"
(2) the value of the relationship furthered by the privilege and "the probability that the
privilege will advance that relationship," (3) any special need for the information at issue,
and (4) the impact on local policies if the privilege is not recognized); cf Timothy V.
Ramis, Comment, Executive Privileges: What Are the Limits?, 54 OR. L. REv. 81, 82 (1975)
("The exact scope of a privilege can be defined by identifying the specific obligation which
the privilege excuses.").
39 See FED. R. Evmn. 503(d) (1) (Proposed Official Draft 1972), reprinted in 56 F.R.D.
183, 236 (U.S. 1972); United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989) ("It is the purpose of
the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege to assure that the 'seal of secrecy,' between lawyer and client does not extend to communications 'made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a fraud' or crime." (citations omitted)); Clark
v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) ("The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused.
A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a
fraud will have no help from the law. He must let the truth be told."); In reAntitrust Grand
Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 164 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[When applying the crime-fraud exception, f]irst,
the government must make a primafade showing that a sufficiently serious crime or fraud
occurred to defeat the privilege; second, the government must establish some relationship
between the communication at issue and the primafacie violation."). For a discussion of
the crime-fraud exception in the context of environmental audits, see Mia Anna Mazza,
The New EvidentiaryPrivilegefor EnvironmentalAudit Reports: Making the Worst of a Bad Situation, 23 EcoLoGY L.Q. 79, 123 (1996).
40 See FED. R EvrD. 503(d) (2) (Proposed Official Draft 1972), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. at
236; see also WEISSENBERGER, supra note 22, § 501.5 at 214.
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issue relate to a breach of duty between the lawyer and the client,4 1
(4) the attorney-client communications at issue relate to "an attested
document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness," 42 or (5) multiple clients share ajoint interest, and one of them communicates with
43
a lawyer retained to represent that common interest.
Proposed Rule 503 does not contemplate the creation of additional exceptions to the attorney-client privilege nor does it distinguish between criminal and civil cases. The opening phrase of Rule
501 in the Federal Rules of Evidence contains the only hint at the
creation of additional restrictions on the attorney-client privilege:
"[e]xcept as otherwise required by the Constitution... or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority."44 Nonetheless, this language implies a legislatively created restriction on the privilege, not a court-created
45
exception.
II
CASE BACKGROUND

This Part will discuss two recent court of appeals decisions that
restrict the scope of the attorney-client privilege as it is applied to gov41 See FED. R. EVID. 503(d) (3) (Proposed Official Draft 1972), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. at
236; see also Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F. Supp. 558, 570 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) (citing Proposed Rule 503(d) (3) in a lawyer-client fee dispute). See generally United

States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 1986) ("A lawyer may reveal otherwise privileged communications from his clients in order to recover a fee due him, or to defend
himself against charges of improper conduct, without violating the ethical rules of confidentiality or the attorney-client privilege." (footnote omitted)); Tasby v. United States, 504
F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974) ("Surely a client is not free to make various allegations of
misconduct and incompetence while the attorney's lips are sealed by invocation of the
attorney-client privilege.... When a client calls into public question the competence of
his attorney, the privilege is waived.").
42 FED. R. EvID. 503 (d) (4) (Proposed Official Draft 1972), reprinted in 56 F.R.D. at 237;
see also WEISSENBERGER, supra note 22, § 501.5, at 214.
43 See FED. R.EVID. 503(d) (5) (Proposed Official Draft 1972), reprintedin 56 F.R.D. at
237; see, e.g., Truck Ins. Exch. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 66 F.R.D. 129, 132 & n.3
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (applying Proposed Rule 503(d) (5) to a fee dispute concerning a trucking
contract). See generally Grand Trunk W.R. Co. v. H.W. Nelson Co., 116 F.2d 823, 835 (6th
Cir. 1941) ("[Wlhen two persons employ a lawyer as their common agent, their communications to him as to strangers will be privileged, but as to themselves ....either can compel
him to testify against the other as to their negotiations in any litigation between them
44
45

FED. R. EVID. 501.

The Restatement of the Law GoverningLawyers supports this assumption in Proposed
Rule 503; it introduces the section on the government attorney-client privilege with the
language, "[u]nless applicable law otherwise provides." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE I-W
GoVERNING LwRs
§ 124 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) [hereinafter REsTATEMENT
GoVERNING LAwYERs]. This language allows "alegislative determination of a need for less

confidentiality" to "prevail over the common-law rule." Id § 124 cmt. b.
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ernment lawyers. These decisions will be discussed in the order in
which they were decided.
The Eighth Circuit Decision: In re GrandJury Subpoena
Duces Tecum

A.
1.

Factual and ProceduralHistory

At the request of the Attorney General Janet Reno, the Division
for the Purpose of Appointing Independent Counsels of the D.C. Circuit ("Special Division") appointed Kenneth W. Starr as Independent
Counsel on August 5, 1994.46 The Special Division asked Starr to investigate matters concerning the relationship between President Clinton, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, and James B. McDougal in
their dealings with Whitewater Development Corporation, Capital
Management Services, Inc., and Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan
Association. 4 7 The Special Division also permitted Starr to investigate
other illegal activities that he might uncover during his Whitewater
investigation. 48 OnJune 21, 1996, the Office of Independent Counsel
(OIC), led by Starr, issued a federal grand jury subpoena to the White
House requiring "production of '[a]ll documents created during
meetings attended by any attorney from the Office of Counsel to the
President and Hillary Rodham Clinton'. . . pertaining to several
Whitewater-related subjects." 4 9 The White House refused to produce
these documents. 50
On August 19, 1996, the OIC filed a motion with the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas to compel the
See United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1315 (8th Cir. 1996). See generally Naftali
46
Bendavid, Another Place in History at Stake: Starr's,AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Sept. 13, 1998, at
H7 (discussing Starr's place in history as the Independent Counsel for the Clinton
investigation).
47 See In re Madison Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, No. 94-1, 1994 WL 913274, at *1 (D.C.
Cir. Aug. 5, 1994); see also Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1315 (describing the full range of tasks assigned to Independent Counsel Starr).
48
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 913 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997); Roberto Suro, Jordan Was Justification To Wen Starr Probe,
WASH. PosrJan. 28, 1998, atA22 (noting that Starr has the power to investigate any matter
"related" to the ongoing Whitewater investigation). The investigation of other illegal matters led Starr down paths that were only tangentially related to the Whitewater investigation. The targets of Starr's probe included the White House Travel Office, the suicide of
Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster, potentially improper White House use of
confidential FBI fies, and potentially illegal activities arising from the relationship between
President Clinton and former White House intern Monica Lewinsky. See Peter S. Canellos,
Starr'sExpandingProbePutsFocus on CounselLaw, BosToN GLOBE, Jan. 22, 1998, at A1; Chris
Mondics, Independent CounselExpands To Covera Lot HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 24, 1998, at A7.
In addition, Starr's original jurisdiction formally expanded several times. See Stephen
Labaton, Independent Counsel Cites Deceit Pattern, N.Y. TuAS, Jan. 22, 1998, at A24.
49
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 913.
See id. at 913-14.
50
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production of two sets of the documents. 5 ' The first set included
notes taken by Miriam Nemetz, an Associate Counsel to the President,
on July 11, 1995, which documented a meeting between Hillary
Rodham Clinton, her personal lawyer David Kendall, and Special
Counsel to the President Jane Sherburne concerning Mrs. Clinton's
activities following the death of President Clinton's Deputy Counsel
Vincent W. Foster, Jr.5 2 The second set included notes taken by
Sherburne on January 26, 1996, which documented a meeting between Mrs. Clinton, Kendall, one of his partners, and Counsel to the
53
President John Quinn.
The White House claimed that because the attorney-client privilege protected these documents, it did not need to forward the documents to the grand jury.5 4 The District Court agreed with the White
House; it held that Mrs. Clinton's reasonable belief that the conversations at issue were privileged sufficed to exempt the notes documenting those conversations from disclosure.5 5 The OIC appealed
the decision to the Eighth Circuit.5 6 A divided panel of the Eighth
Circuit reversed, and held that the attorney-client privilege does not
protect conversations between government attorneys and government
clients from disclosure to a grand jury. 57 The United States Supreme
58
Court denied a petition for certiorari.
2.

The Majority Opinion

Before the Eighth Circuit, Mrs. Clinton asserted that the attorneyclient privilege should protect her conversations with White House
Counsel. 59 She asked the court to extend the Supreme Court's holding in Upjohn Co. v. United States60 to government attorneys and their
51 See id. at 914.
52 See id
53 See id. Ironically, these two sets of notes very likely provided little useful information for Starr's investigation. SeeJames A. Barnes, Starr Wins, Ickes Talks, Lake Writes, NAT'L
J., June 28, 1997, at 1340, 1340.
54 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 914.
55 See id. The District Court also held that "the work product doctrine prevented
disclosure of the [documents] to the grand jury." Id.
56 See id. at 913.
57 See ia at 915.
58
See Office of President v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
59 One contention that neither the majority nor the dissent challenged was that one
could consider First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton a "client" of the White House Counsel
under Proposed Rule 503. For the text of Proposed Rule 503, see supra text accompanying

note 23. If Mrs. Clinton was not a client of the White House Counsel, then the attorneyclient privilege clearly would not protect conversations she may have had with White
House lawyers. Because the assumption that Mrs. Clinton was a client is not central to this
Note's argument, the Note will neither challenge nor further examine it.
60
449 U.S. 383 (1981). The majority in Upjohn limited the applicability of its ruling to
the facts of that case. See id at 386 ("We decline to lay down a broad rule or series of rules
to govern all conceivable future questions in this area, even were we able to do so.").
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government clients. 61 Upjohn held that the attorney-client privilege
applies not only to communications between corporate executives and
corporate counsel, but also to communications between corporate
62
employees and corporate counsel.
The OIC, however, argued that the Eighth Circuit should apply
the standards established by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Nixon,68 a case that concerned the executive privilege. 64 The OIC
asked the court to recognize Nixon's limitation on government privileges 65 and to hold that the government's need for information re-

lated to a criminal investigation outweighs the general need for
66
confidentiality of White House communications.
The Eighth Circuit's majority sided with the Independent Counsel, 6 7 and held that the White House Counsel could not invoke the

attorney-client privilege as justification for its refusal to comply with a
federal grand jury subpoena.68 The majority justified this decision
with two basic arguments. First, the court distinguished the long line
of decisions that extend the attorney-client privilege to government
entities on the ground that none of those cases involve the invocation
of the privilege in the criminal context. 69 While the majority acknowledged the deep roots of the attorney-client privilege in American legal
history,70 it did not identify which elements of Proposed Rule 50371
were missing in the context of federal grand jury subpoenas directed
to White House lawyers.
Second, the court adopted the principle that government officials
72
should disclose incriminating information within their possession;
the court noted that to privilege information which is relevant to a
61

See In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 919-20.
449 U.S. at 390-97.
63
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
64
See id. at 703-16; infra notes 227-38 and accompanying text.
65
See 418 U.S. at 707.
66
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 919.
67
See id, at 919-21.
68
See id&
at 925-26.
69
See id. at 917-18. The court's analysis was rather cursory on this important point.
The court simply cited Nixon for the proposition that the executive privilege does not apply
equally in criminal and civil matters. See id. It also cited two circuit court decisions that
limited the reporter's privilege in criminal cases. See id. at 918. However, the court gave no
explanation as to why these analogies apply to the instant case, or why the reasoning used
in those cases overwhelms the justification for the attorney-client privilege the court had
previously acknowledged in civil cases.
70
See id. at 915 ("The White House is correct, of course, in its assertion that the attorney-client privilege is the oldest known to the common law.").
71 For the text of Proposed Rule 503, see supra text accompanying note 23.
72
See In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 918, 920-21. But cf.Rudolf
& Maher, supranote 35, at 41 (arguing that the Eighth Circuit, in its unqualified support of
openness in government, "ignores the value of the attorney-client privilege").
62
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federal grand jury investigation would constitute a misuse of government resources. 73
3.

The Dissent

The dissenting opinion applied a more literal interpretation of
Proposed Rule 503. Judge Richard G. Kopf 74 concluded that the

White House Counsel could invoke the attorney-client privilege during federal grand jury investigations, because each element of Rule
503 is satisfied in that context.7 5 Judge Kopf also argued that the standards established for the evaluation of the executive privilege in
United States v. Nixon7 6 should be applied in this case involving the
77
attorney-client privilege.
Judge Kopf started with a discussion of Proposed Rule 503. He
agreed with the majority that the Rule is an accurate reflection of the
federal common law definition of the attorney-client privilege.7 8 Unlike the majority, however, Judge Kopf not only examined the general
principles concerning the application of the privilege to this case, but
also considered the individual elements of Proposed Rule 503. Based
on this examination, he drew two conclusions: First, he observed that
Proposed Rule 503 does not distinguish between civil and criminal
cases.7 9 Judge Kopf rationalized the lack of precedent in this area8 ° by
noting that "intragovernmental disputes in the federal criminal arena
seldom arise. "81 Second, citing a string of cases that apply the attorney-client privilege to government communications, Judge Kopf concluded that invocation of the privilege in this case would serve the
public interest.8 2 He felt the Upjohn rule,8 3 recognizing a limited attorney-client privilege for intracorporate communications, should be
extended to government entities because the privilege "is intended to
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 921.
74 Judge Kopf is a United States District Court judge for the District of Nebraska. He
sat on the Eighth Circuit panel by designation. See id. at 913 n.1.
75
See id. at 933-35 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
76 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
77 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 935 (Kopf, J., dissenting)
("Once we decide that the White House has a privilege that the [Independent Counsel]
seeks to overcome, the only precedent that matters is United States v. Nixon." (citation
omitted)).
78 See id. at 929 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
79 See id. (Kopf, J., dissenting).
80
The majority examined cases which involve the application of the attorney-client
privilege to government attorneys in civil cases and its application to private attorneys
before grand juries. The majority was not persuaded that these decisions constitute adequate precedent for a ruling in favor of the application of the attorney-client privilege to
government attorneys whom federal grand juries subpoena. See ia at 916-18.
81 Id. at 929 (Kopf, J., dissenting). Kopf further argued that there is no precedent
denying the existence of the privilege in these cases. See id. (Kopf, J., dissenting).
82 See id. at 929-32 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
83
See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981).
73
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encourage officials, who may be fearful of losing theirjobs, their reputations, their privacy, or their liberty, to tell the organization the raw
84
truth so it can comply with the law."

Nevertheless, Judge Kopf's support for the government attorneyclient privilege was not unconditional. He proposed that the court
balance the need for the privilege against the need for the information sought by the grand jury.8 5 Judge Kopf posed the following question: "Is the White House's attorney-client privilege generally more
important than a grand jury's criminal investigation of the White
House?"8 6 He answered the question by interpreting Nixon as favoring "a grand jury's need for evidence of the truth" over "the President's general need for confidentiality. 8 7T Although Nixon involved
the executive privilege and not the attorney-client privilege, Kopf
viewed Nixon's balancing as an appropriate method for the evaluation
of any asserted governmental privilege.8 8 In applying the balancing to
the instant case, Judge Kopf would have required "a preliminary showing [by the OIC] of specific need, relevance, and admissibility to a
district judge" before the safe haven of the attorney-client privilege
could be invaded.8 9
The Eighth Circuit was the first circuit to limit the coverage of the
government attorney-client privilege during grand jury proceedings.
In 1998, the D.C. Circuit became the second to consider this issue.
B. The District of Columbia Circuit Decision: In re Lindsey
1. Factualand ProceduralHistory
The Lindsey decision was a product of the expanded jurisdiction
of the Starr investigation. 90 On January 16, 1998, following a request
by Attorney General Janet Reno, the Special Division authorized Independent Counsel Starr to investigate alleged violations of federal
law committed by former White House intern Monica Lewinsky and
others during the litigation of the sexual harassment lawsuit filed by
Paula Corbin Jones against President Clinton.9 1 As the grand jury investigation of those allegations began, Starr's office issued a subpoena
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 931-32 (Kopf,J., dissenting).
85 For further discussion of Judge Kopf s proposed disposition of this case, see infia
notes 264-71 and accompanying text.
86 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 936 (Kopf,J., dissenting).
87 Id. (Kopf, J., dissenting).
88 Judge Kopf argued that "as the Nixon court made clear, the appropriate approach
is to balance the governmental privilege asserted by the White House (whether it be the
attorney-.client privilege or some other privilege) against the competing governmental interest asserted by the [Independent Counsel]." Id.at 929 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
89 Id. at 937 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
90 See supranote 48 and accompanying text.
91 See In re Motions of DowJones & Co., Inc., 142 F.3d 496, 497-98 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 60 (1998).
84
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to Bruce R. Lindsey, a Deputy White House Counsel and an Assistant
to the President, to testify before the grand jury.92 Although Lindsey
appeared before the grand jury, he refused to answer a number of
questions by asserting that the attorney-client and executive privileges
protected the requested information from disclosure. 93
Independent Counsel Starr challenged these privilege claims
before the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 94
The District Court granted Starr's motion to compel Lindsey's testimony95 and ruled that although the President's discussions with White
House Counsel are protected by the attorney-client privilege, this privilege is limited by the grand jury's need for the subpoenaed
96
information.
The Office of the President appealed this decision to the D.C.
Circuit. 97 However, before the case could be heard by the D.C. Circuit, Starr petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the case on an expedited basis. 98 Although the Supreme Court denied the request, 99 it
admonished the D.C. Circuit to "proceed expeditiously to decide
[the] case."'100
2.

The Majority Opinion

Lindsey's invocation of the government attorney-client privilege
in his refusal to answer questions posed by the federal grand jury
presented the D.C. Circuit with the same issue previously considered
by the Eighth Circuit. The D.C. Circuit phrased the issue as follows:
"[W]hether an attorney in the Office of the President, having been
called before a federal grand jury, may refuse, on the basis of a government attorney-client privilege, to answer questions about possible
criminal conduct by government officials and others."' 0 ' The court,
in a two-to-one decision, held that White House attorneys may not
92 Seeln reLindsey, 148F.3d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), affd inpartand rev'd
in part, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
93 See id.The executive privilege issue was not raised before the D.C. Circuit. See id.
("Neither the Office of the President nor the President in his personal capacity has appealed the district court's ruling on executive privilege."); see also David Willman & Ronald
J. Ostrow, Clinton Abandons Executive Privilege Claim in Inquiry, L.A. TMnEs, June 2, 1998, at
Al (reporting that the White House abandoned the executive-privilege defense before the
D.C. Circuit).
94
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 24 (D.D.C. 1998).
95 See id. at 39-40.
96 See id.
at 33-36.
97 See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1103.
98 See id.
99 See id
100 United States v. Clinton, 118 S. Ct. 2079, 2080 (1998).
101 In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1102.

1999]

GOVERNMENT PRIVILEGE

1699

refuse to answer those questions on the basis of the attorney-client
10 2
privilege.
The majority justified its decision by asserting that the public demand for honesty in government necessitates the exposure of government wrongdoing. 0 3 They argued for limiting the scope of the
government attorney-client privilege. 104 Additionally, the court emphasized the need for government lawyers in particular to expose
wrongdoing by government employees and officials. The majority argued that government attorneys are obligated by "reason and experience, duty, and tradition" to disclose evidence of government
improprieties. 10 5 The court felt that this exposure of government
wrongdoing by government attorneys fosters democratic principles, as
"'openness in government has always been thought crucial to ensur' 06
ing that the people remain in control of their government."
The D.C. Circuit also rejected arguments made by the President's
counsel that the government attorney-client privilege in the grand
jury context serves the public interest. 10 7 The court believed that
communications between government clients and their government
counsel will remain honest and complete, even under a narrow con102
103
104

See id. ("To state the question is to suggest the answer ...
See id.

See id, at 1107 ("'More particularized [privilege] rules may be necessary where one
agency of government claims the privilege in resisting a demand for information by another. Such rules should take account of the complex considerations of governmental
structure, tradition, and regulation that are involved.'" (quoting RESTATEMENT GOVERNING
LAWYERS, supra note 45, § 124 cmt. b)). The court added that the lack of existing case law
on the issue of government attorneys who refuse to comply with grand jury subpoenas is
evidence that the government attorney-client privilege is generally more limited than the
ordinary common law attorney-client privilege. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1108. See
generally Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counse4 86 GEo L.J. 2133,
2173 (1998) (criticizing the government attorney-client privilege in criminal cases because
of the lack of precedent in support thereof). The logic of Kavanaugh's criticism is somewhat puzzling because the court found no opinions either affirming or rejecting the privilege in this context. But cf.In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting
in the context of a proposed protective function privilege on behalf of the Secret Service
that "we do not regard the absence of precedent as weighing heavily against recognition of
the privilege").
105
In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1108.
106 Id. at 1109-10 (quoting In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1997)); cf
'We the People' Are Lindsey's Bosses, TENNmSSFAN, Aug. 7, 1998, at 18A ("The broad and until
now the unchallenged assumption is that [government] attorneys are hired for the public
good-not to render personal, legal advice to specific office-holders."). The court supported this argument by referring to the following provision in the United States Code:
"Any information... received in a department or agency of the executive branch of the
Government relating to violations of title 18 involving Government officers and employees
shall be expeditiously reported to the Attorney General." 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) (1994). The
court elected not to answer the question of whether this provision alone compels the testimony of government attorneys before federal grand juries. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at
1110. However, it did argue that § 535(b) shows a congressional policy preference for
disclosure of information by government employees. See id.
107 See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1111-14.
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struction of the attorney-client privilege, because the limited exception created in this case applies only to discussions that concern
criminal activities.' 08
Finally, the court rejected an argument made by the President's
counsel that the need for confidential communication between the
President and government lawyers is even greater when the President's counsel is in the midst of preparing him for impeachment proceedings. 10 9 The majority held that because the impeachment
process is a-political, and not a legal, process, and because the procedures used by the House of Representatives in an impeachment proceeding or by the Senate in a trial of the President are not traditional
"legal" proceedings, the typical protections afforded by the attorneyclient privilege do not apply in the impeachment context. 110
3.

The Dissent

Judge David S. Tatel dissented in part from the D.C. Circuit's decision. He argued for an expansive attorney-client privilege for government lawyers, especially for White House Counsel."' Judge Tatel
would have remanded the case back to the district court with instructions to develop a more complete record to determine the exact con1 12
tent of Bruce Lindsey's conversations with President Clinton.
Judge Tatel perceived this information as necessary to assess whether
the elements of the attorney-client privilege were satisfied during
those discussions." 3
The essence of Judge Tatel's disagreement with the majority
stemmed from the value he placed on confidential legal advice given
by White House Counsel to the President. 1 14 He argued that the protections offered by the government attorney-client privilege should
not be lost during grand jury proceedings." 5 Rather, Judge Tatel
108

See id. at 1112. The majority supported this argument with reference to similar

limitations placed upon the executive privilege. See id The executive privilege protects
information which is of "vital importance to the security and prosperity of the nation," yet
is not an absolute privilege; therefore, the court's argument goes, the government attorney-client privilege, which protects far less valuable information, similarly need not be absolute. Id at 1114.
109 See i& at 1112-13. Although the formal impeachment proceedings against President Clinton had not yet begun at the time of the D.C. Circuit's decision, the impeachment risk emerged because the Independent Counsel statute, which was the foundation of
Starr's authority, authorized him to "advise the House of Representatives of any substantial
and credible information ... that may constitute grounds for an impeachment." 28 U.S.C.
§ 595(c) (1994).
110 See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1113.
111 See id at 1118 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
112 See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
113
See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
114 See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
115 See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
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noted that an expansive government attorney-client privilege can promote the values that are advanced by the private attorney-client privilege, including fostering complete and honest discussion with legal
advisors. 116 He feared that a limitation on the government attorneyclient privilege would reduce the confidence of government clients,
including the President, when conversing about legal matters with
government counsel, because they could never be certain that even
seemingly innocuous information would not become relevant evi7
dence in a federal criminal investigation."
Judge Tatel challenged the majority's comparison of the executive and attorney-client privileges. He distinguished the constitutionally based executive privilege 18 from the attorney-client privilege,
which is a product of the common law, 119 by arguing that the executive privilege extends to policy or political advice, while the attorneyclient privilege protects only legal advice. 12 0 Judge Tatel found this to
be a critical distinction, because legal advice by its unique nature re1
quires confidentiality, "as recognized by centuries of common law."

1

The bulk of Judge Tatel's opinion concerned the special demands of the Presidency, and the need for an expansive government
attorney-client privilege for White House Counsel. 12 2 He argued that
because federal executive powers are concentrated in one President,
who serves as "head of the Executive Branch, Commander-in-Chief,
head of State, and [is] removable only by impeachment," decisions
about the types of advice that should be given to the President, and
the limits which should be placed on the advice, must be undertaken
with great care. 12 3 Judge Tatel further argued that because the Office
of the Presidency and the President himself are inextricably bound,
"official matters . . . often have personal implications for a President."124 For Judge Tatel, this blurring of personal and official mat116

117

See id at 1122 (TatelJ., dissenting).
See idL at 1119 (Tatel, J., dissenting).

118 See Wolfe v. Department of Health & Human Servs., 839 F.2d 768, 773 n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); In re Irving, 600 F.2d 1027, 1036 (2d Cir. 1979); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700,
781 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
119 See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989); Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
120 SeeIn reLindsey, 148 F.3d at 1120 (TatelJ., dissenting). This is a point of disagreement betweenjudge Tatel's dissenting opinion in In reLindsey andJudge Kopf's dissenting
opinion before the Eighth Circuit. Judge Kopf would have held that the restrictions devised in United States v. Nixon for the executive privilege also should be applied to the
government attorney-client privilege. See infra notes 264-71 and accompanying text.
121 In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1120 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
122 See id. at 1121-22 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
123 Id, at 1121 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
124 Id. (Tatel,J., dissenting); see also Naftali Bendavid, Thin Line SeparatesPersona Presidential Layering,CHi. TRIB., June 30, 1998, at 1 ("The question of how to separate Clinton's personal legal problems from his public ones has not been easy."); Ruth Marcus,
White House Lawyer Role Faces Tes WASH. Posr, June 29, 1998, at Al ("'I don't believe
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ters meant that discussions of official business easily could be
intermingled with "sensitive, embarrassing, or even potentially crimi1 25

nal topics."'

Judge Tatel concluded that the court should have remanded the
case to the district court to determine whether Bruce Lindsey's supposedly privileged discussions satisfied all the elements of the attorney-client privilege. 12 6 This conclusion reflects Judge Tatel's concern
that because Lindsey served as both legal counsel and Special Assistant to President Clinton, 2 7 some of his advice to the President may
have been political, rather than legal, advice. 128 Political advice is not
29
protected by the attorney-client privilege.'
III
TBE GovERNMENT ATroRNEY-CLiENT PRIvniEGE Is
NECESSARY

IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

These two decisions by the Eighth and D.C. Circuits limit the
availability of the government attorney-client privilege in grand jury
proceedings. 130 This Part will consider the government attorney-client privilege from the perspective of government attorneys, government employees, and the Office of the President. Although the facts
of both the Eighth and D.C. Circuit cases involved the Office of the
President and federal grand juries, the rationale of both courts is applicable to government attorneys at any level of government in any
there's any way for White House counsel to differentiate personal from official.'" (quoting
former White House special counsel Lanny J. Davis)). Judge Tatel also challenged the
majority's invocation of 28 U.S.C. § 535(b) and noted that the section is inapplicable to the
Office of the President. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1120 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
125 In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1121 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
126
See id. at 1123 (TatelJ., dissenting).
127 See id.(Tatel, J., dissenting).
128 See id.(Tatel, J., dissenting).
129
See United States v. White, 970 F.2d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The attorney-client
privilege does not protect all communications between an attorney and his client. Rather,
it shields from disclosure only communications made for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice."). The requirement of legal advice appears in various definitions of the attorneyclient privilege. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note
23. For example, in Wigmore's definition, protected conversations must concern "legal
advice" and the advice must come "from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as
such." 4 WIGMORE, supra note 18, § 2292, at 3204.
130 The grand jury is a vehicle the government uses to determine if sufficient evidence
exists to indict a person for the commission of a crime. See United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 343 (1974). A grand jury does not actually determine a person's guilt or innocence; see id.; it merely determines whether evidence exists that is capable of proving that a
violation of the law has occurred. See United States v. R.Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297
(1991). Courts have no control over grandjuries. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S.
36,47-48 (1992). For a detailed history of the grandjury, see Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked
Door of anAmerican GrandJury: Its History, Its Secrety, and Its Process, 24 FiA. ST. U. L. Rav. 1
(1996).
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type of litigation.' 31 This Part will explore the rationale for the government attorney-client privilege and consider the effect of the Eighth
and D.C. Circuit rulings on the future of the privilege.
A. A Brief History of the Government Attorney-Client Privilege
Because the federal government is frequently a party to litigation, 132 questions about the application of the attorney-client privilege
to the federal government arise often. 133 But the scope of this privilege has not been limited to the federal government. Courts have applied the attorney-client privilege not only to communications at the
federal levels" but to communications involving attorneys represent131 See infra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
132 See Neal Devins, Toward an Understandingof Legal Policy-Making at Independent Agendes, in GoyRNzEENT LAWYERS, supra note 3, at 181, 181; Herz, supra note 11, at 895-96.
133 See Keller, supra note 33, at 1024-25. Keller notes:
The federal government must seek legal advice more often than corporations or individuals, for the government must not only obey the law, it
must formulate and enforce it. It is therefore important that courts avoid
applying an overly constricted attorney-client privilege to the government
because such a privilege might deter agencies from seeking essential legal
advice.
Id.
134 See, e.g., Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438,
1458 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding that an attorney-client relationship exists between the Corps
of Engineers and the U.S. Attorney); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Air
Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that the attorney-client privilege applies
to Air Force documents under exemption five of the Freedom of Information Act); Martin
v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 140 F.R.D. 291, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that a memorandum between an Acting Associate Solicitor of the U.S. Department of Labor and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration is under the protection of the attorney-client privilege); McCaugherty v. Siffermann, 132 F.R.D. 234, 237
(N.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that the protection of attorney-client privilege exists between a
subsidiary of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and its attorneys);
United States v. Davis, 131 F.R.D. 391, 397-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the attorneyclient privilege covers the interview of a United States Maritime Administration official by
an FBI agent); SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd., 92 F.R.D. 65, 67 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (holding that the attorney-client privilege extends to communications between an SEC investigator and SEC counsel); Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 57 F.R.D. 133, 138-39
(E.D. Wis. 1972) (noting that the attorney-client relationship may exist between the antitrust division of the United States Department ofJustice and the Securities and Exchange
Commission); Detroit Screwmatic Co. v. United States, 49 F.R.D. 77, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(holding that defense letters by the Chief Counsel for the Internal Revenue Service are
protected by the attorney-client privilege in a suit by a taxpayer); United States v. Gates, 35
F.R.D. 524, 526 (D. Colo. 1964) (noting on the basis of the court's prior ruling that communications between a government agency and the Department of Justice as its attorney
may be protected by the attorney-client privilege); United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D.
518, 522-23 (D. Colo. 1963) (noting that the attorney-client privilege covers "communications between administrative personnel and the legal counsel of [the] Small Business Administration and the United States Attorney's office" under certain conditions). See
generallyIn re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), aft d in part and rev'd in
part, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998) ("Courts,
commentators, and government lawyers have long recognized a government attorney-client privilege in several contexts."); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Department of Energy, 617
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ing states and municipalities as well. 135 The case law is consistent with
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers' 3 6 and the Model
Code of Professional Conduct, 13 7 which recognize that the protections offered by the attorney-client privilege apply to communications
involving government attorneys.
Nonetheless, several gaps remain in the approaches of the Restatement, the Model Code, and the common law with respect to the
application of the attorney-client privilege to government attorneys.
Commentators have paid scant attention to the standards applicable
F.2d 854, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("[A]n agency can be a 'client' and agency lawyers can
function as 'attorneys' within the relationship contemplated by the privilege .... ."); Department of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 139 F.RD. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
("Clearly, a government agency can be a 'client' and agency lawyers can function as 'attorneys' within the relationship contemplated by the [attorney-client] privilege."); Green v.
IRS, 556 F. Supp. 79, 85 (N.D. Ind. 1982), affd, 734 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting that
the attorney-client privilege "unquestionably is applicable to the relationship between Government attorneys and administrative personnel"); Jupiter Painting Contracting Co. v.
United States, 87 F.R.D. 593, 598 (E.D. Pa. 1980) ("Courts generally have accepted that
attorney-client privilege applies in the governmental context.... ."); United States v. AT&T,
86 F.R.D. 603, 621 (D.D.C. 1979) (noting that the government attorney-client privilege
should be held to the same standard as the privilege applied to corporations); 26 CHARLES
ALAN WmrGHT & KENNE
W. GRA4m.,
JR., FEDERAL PRAICE AND PROCEDURE § 5662, at
469 (1992) ("[G]overnmental entities can sometimes claim the . . . attorney-client
privilege.").
135 See, e.g., Boyer v. Board of County Comm'rs, 162 F.R.D. 687, 690 (D. Kan. 1995)
(citing U'ohn for the proposition that the attorney-client privilege protects communications between a county employee and a county attorney); Texaco, Inc. v. Louisiana Land &
Exploration Co., 805 F. Supp. 385, 389 (M.D. La. 1992) (holding that the attorney-client
privilege is an exception to the state public records law); Metro Wastewater Reclamation
Dist. v. Continental Cas. Co., 142 F.R.D. 471, 476 (D. Colo. 1992) (holding that attorneyclient privilege protects an agreement between city attorneys and a sewage processor);
Buford v. Holladay, 133 F.R.D. 487, 492 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (holding that confidential consultations between the State Department of Economic Development and the State Attorney
General are covered by the privilege); Bruce v. Christian, 113 F.R.D. 554, 560 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (holding that the attorney-client privilege applies to memoranda based on interviews
of New York City Housing Authority managers by Housing Authority attorneys); State v.
Today's Bookstore, Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1283, 1288 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a
memorandum from a city prosecutor to a city manager is protected by the attorney-client
privilege); cf Chiles v. State Employees Attorneys Guild, 714 So. 2d 502, 506 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1998) ("'The fact that a lawyer is hired by a state agency rather than by individual
clients does not negate a lawyer's basic ethical obligations.'" (quoting the lower court opinion)). See generally Hearn v. Rhay, 68 FR.D. 574, 579 (E.D. Wash. 1975) ("Federal courts
have uniformly held that the attorney-client privilege can arise with respect to attorneys
representing a state." (citations omitted)).
136 According to the Restatement, "[u]nless applicable law otherwise provides, the attorney-client privilege extends to a communication of a governmental organization... and
of an individual officer, employee, or other agent of a governmental organization as a
client with respect to his or her personal interest." RESTATEMENT GOvERNING LA-WYERs,
supra note 45, § 124.
137 According to the Model Code, "[the requirement of maintaining confidentiality
of information relating to representation applies to government lawyers who may disagree
with the policy goals that their representation is designed to advance." MODEL RULES OF
PROFEsSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.6 cmt. 6 (1983).
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to the privilege for government attorneys, 3 8 probably because courts
never before have questioned the application of the attorney-client
privilege to government attorneys. Consequently, there is no discussion in either the case law or the legal literature distinguishing the
privilege for government employees from the privilege for private citizens. Additionally, there exist few published decisions concerning the
invocation of the attorney-client privilege by government counsel
served with grand jury subpoena. One may attribute these gaps to the
fairly specific context under which the issue arises: it is rare for two
government entities to oppose each other in court in criminal
139
cases.
Despite the dearth of precedent in this area, the Eighth Circuit
majority found two cases in which courts applied the government attorney-client privilege to grand jury investigations. 140 The first case
was an intermediate appellate court decision in NewJersey. 14 1 In that
case a grand jury investigated two allegations: The first allegation set
forth that the County Adjuster's Office improperly disclosed medical
records during a political campaign. The second allegation set forth
14 2
that the Adjuster did not properly perform her assigned tasks.
Outside counsel represented the Adjuster's Office. 143 When asked to
appear before the grand jury to disclose the information received during the investigation, the counsel refused to do so on the grounds of
the attorney-client privilege. 4 4 The New Jersey court held that despite the need for a grand jury to have a complete picture of the
events under investigation, it is necessary to protect discussions between government clients and government counsel from disclosure to
the grand jury.145 The New Jersey court reasoned that the govern138
See Keller, supra note 33, at 1005 ("No test for applying the privilege to the executive branch of the federal government has been succinctly articulated or widely adopted

139 See In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 929 (8th Cir.) (KopfJ.,
dissenting) ("[I]ntragovernmental disputes in the federal criminal arena seldom arise, regardess of whether the attorney-client privilege is involved."), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1105
(1997). But see In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (interpreting
the lack of existing caselaw in this area to mean that the government attorney-client privilege has never been construed as broadly as the ordinary common-law attorney-client privilege), afd in part and reu'd in part, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 466 (1998).
140
Even though persuasive and on point, neither of these cases bound the Eighth or
D.C. Circuits. Nonetheless, the arguments made in these cases for the recognition of the
government attorney-client privilege in the grand jury context should at a minimum inform any consideration of this issue.
141 See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 574 A.2d 449 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1989).
142 See id. at 451.
143 See id. at 451-52 & n.1.
144 See id. at 452.
145 See id. at 453-55.
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ment attorney-client privilege in the grand jury context helps the government client to receive quality legal advice and thereby serves the
14 6
public interest.
The Eighth Circuit distinguished the New Jersey case from the
facts of the case before it on three grounds: First, the Eighth Circuit
argued that the New Jersey court did not actually apply the government attorney-client privilege because the court remanded the case to
a lower court to determine whether the facts justified application of
the privilege.' 47 Second, the Eighth Circuit distinguished the county
officials involved in the New Jersey case from the federal officials involved in the Whitewater case it considered. 148 Third, the Eighth Circuit felt that the New Jersey case involved private lawyers who were
hired to assist the county and therefore could not be compelled to
testify before a grand jury. 149 By contrast, the government lawyers in
the Eighth and D.C. Circuit cases were permanent government counsel, not private counsel temporarily hired to handle a particular matter facing government officials. 150
These distinctions do not fully appreciate the arguments made by
the NewJersey court in its discussion of the attorney-client privilege as
applied to government attorneys in the context of grand jury investigations. The New Jersey Superior Court considered the values that
the attorney-client privilege protects and found that the privilege is
fully applicable in the grand jury context. 15 1 Additionally, the New
Jersey court gave substantial attention to the federal common law of
the attorney-client privilege. 15 2 Although the Eighth Circuit was correct in asserting that the New Jersey court failed to discuss the differences between the privilege as it is applied at the county and federal
levels,153 the Eighth Circuit itself failed to appreciate the increased
importance of the attorney-client privilege when applied at the federal
level. Indeed, the values supported by the privilege are enhanced
when White House Counsel are involved, because the issues they consider and the advice they give to the President are likely to be of na54
tional importance.'
146 See
147 See
denied, 521
148
See
149

id. at 454.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir.), cert.
U.S. 1105 (1997).
id.

See id.

150 Although the facts which the Eighth Circuit considered involved both Mrs. Clinton's private counsel and White House counsel, Starr sought notes from only the White
House Counsel. See iL at 913.
151 See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 574 A.2d at 454-55.
152 See id. at 454.
153 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 917.
154 See infra Part III.C.
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The Eighth Circuit also discussed a Sixth Circuit decision, In re
GrandJury Subpoena.155 That decision involved a government attorney's claim that he did not have to comply with a federal grand jury
subpoena on the grounds of the attorney-client privilege. In the Sixth
Circuit decision, the City of Detroit sought to quash a federal grand
jury subpoena that sought the production of minutes from certain Detroit City Council meetings. 156 The city argued that these notes fell
within the scope of the attorney-client privilege. 157 The Sixth Circuit
did not deny the applicability of the privilege in the federal grand jury
context, but remanded the case to consider whether the discussions at
158
issue were, in fact, confidential.
The Eighth Circuit distinguished this case from the facts of its
case on three grounds: First, the court again reasoned that the Sixth
Circuit remanded the case and did not actually apply the privilege to a
particular set of facts. 159 Second, because the Sixth Circuit case involved a standoff between a federal grand jury and a city government,
the Eighth Circuit felt the case involved federalism issues not present
in the facts before it.160 Third, the Eighth Circuit was not persuaded
by the Sixth Circuit's rather brief legal analysis; the Sixth Circuit did
not examine the application of the privilege to government attorneys
16 1
in depth.
These reasons reduce, but do not eliminate, the precedential
value of the Sixth Circuit's decision. The court remanded the case to
consider whether the privilege applied to the particular facts before
the court, not whether it is applicable in the ideal situation. 162 The
Sixth Circuit did not even entertain the possibility that an exception

157

886 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1989).
See id. at 136.
See i&

158

See id. at 138-39. For the protection of the attorney-client privilege to apply, the

155
156

discussion between attorney and client must be confidential. See4 WIGMORE, supra note 18,
§ 2292, at 3204 (listing the requirement that the communications must be "made in confidence" as one element of the definition of the attorney-client privilege (typeface altered)).
Some commentators recently have challenged the virtue of this requirement. See Paul R.
Rice, Attorne)-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47

DuKE L.J. 853, 861 (1998) ("Confidentiality... should be abandoned as a requirement for
the attorney-client privilege because compliance with it generates significant unnecessary

costs in the preservation of the secrecy, the proof of that preservation, and the resolution
of disputes surrounding it."); cf.Daniel L Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality,65 U. CHi. L.
Rnv. 1, 3 (1998) ("IG]onfidentiality benefits lawyers because it increases the demand for
legal services. The legal profession, not clients or society as a whole, is the primary beneficiary of confidentiality rules.").

159 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir.); cert.
denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
160 See id
161 See id. This lack of in-depth consideration indicates that the Sixth Circuit did not
consider it to be a controversial legal question.
162 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 886 F.2d at 138-39.
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to the common law attorney-client privilege might exist in the federal
grand jury context.
B. The Justifications for the Government Attorney-Client
Privilege Apply in Criminal Investigations
Despite the limited history of the application of the government
attorney-client privilege in grand jury proceedings, the justifications
for the attorney-client privilege' 63 nonetheless apply in the grand jury
context. This section will examine the justifying purposes of the government attorney-client privilege as they apply to criminal
investigations.
1. Preliminary Considerations
Prior to the Eighth and D.C. Circuit opinions, no court challenged the notion that the justifications for the government attorneyclient privilege in fact apply in criminal investigations.'6 Additionally, neither Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence nor Proposed
Rule 503 forbids the application of the privilege in criminal cases or
distinguish between criminal and civil cases. 165 The Eighth Circuit's
decision, followed by the D.C. Circuit, effectively carved out a new exception to the government attorney-client privilege in the context of
federal grand jury subpoenas issued to government counsel.
See supra notes 25-35 and accompanying text.
See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, _
118 S. Ct. 2081, 2087
(1998) ("[T]here is no case authority for the proposition that the privilege applies differently in criminal and civil cases .... "); Lowell, supra note 13, at A21 ("For more than 200
years, American law recognized that the privilege was necessary to encourage people to
seek out legal advice and to ensure that lawyers could properly protect their clients' confidences. The privilege did not depend on whether the issues being discussed had civil or
criminal aspects .... ."). Obviously one can view this lack of discussion in two ways: the lack
of precedent either provides an opportunity to carve out an exception to the privilege, or
demonstrates that this exception has never been contemplated before. The latter approach seems to be consistent with the purposes of privileges generally. Although courts
construe privileges narrowly, see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) ("[T]hese
exceptions to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth."), one should not create
privilege rules on a case-by-case basis, see Swidler & Berlin, 118 S. Ct. at 2087 ("A 'no harm in
one more exception' rationale could contribute to the general erosion of the privilege
... ."); In reLindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1119 (D.C. Cir.) (Tatel, J., dissenting) ("[T]his case
involves.., as in Swidler, the carving out of an exception to an already well-established
privilege."), aff'd in part and rev'd inpart, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
466 (1998). The Restatement contains the only contemplation of an exception to the
government attorney-client privilege that supplements the exceptions to the private attorney-client privilege; it excepts from the coverage of the government attorney-client privilege those communications specifically excluded by a statute. See REsTATEMENT GOVERNING
LAW-YERS, supra note 45, § 124. Nonetheless, the Eighth and D.C. Circuits did not refer to
any statutorily created exception to the privilege in their opinions.
165
See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text
163
164
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Two factors helped the Eighth and D.C. Circuits justify the new
exception: First, neither court found case law on point. 66 Second,
both courts placed a virtually absolute value on the disclosure of information by government employees.' 67 The Eighth Circuit noted that
"to allow any part of the federal government to use its in-house attorneys as a shield against the production of information relevant to a
federal criminal investigation would represent a gross misuse of public
assets. '1 68 The Eighth Circuit did not temper this statement with any
discussion of the need for confidentiality in government communications. The D.C. Circuit echoed this justification and argued that
"[t]he obligation of a government lawyer to uphold the public trust
reposed in him or her strongly militates against allowing the client
agency to invoke a privilege to prevent the lawyer from providing evidence of the possible commission of criminal offenses within the
69
government."
2.

Attorney-Client PrivilegeJustifications Reexamined

There are justifications for applying the attorney-client privilege
when a government attorney consults with a government client who is,
or could be, the subject of a federal grand jury investigation. This
section will discuss three ways in which the justifications for the privilege apply in the context of criminal investigations of government
employees.
First, invocation of the privilege by government clients encourages open and honest discussion between lawyer and client. 70 The
166
See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1108; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112
F.3d 910, 917-18 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
167 For the proposition that an overly broad attorney-client privilege in the context of
government attorneys would be dangerous, the Eighth Circuit's majority cited JupiterPainting Contracting Co. v. United States, 87 F.R.D. 593 (E.D. Pa. 1980). In Jupiter Painting,a
taxpayer sued the federal government "for refund and abatement of federal employment
withholding taxes." Id. at 545. During discovery, the government disclosed many documents, but refused to produce some documents on the ground that the government attorney-client privilege exempted them from disclosure. See id. The court in Jupiter Painting
noted the general "apprehension at [the] pernicious potential [of the attorney-client privilege] in a government top-heavy with lawyers." Id. at 598. But it refused to limit the attorney-client privilege in the context of government attorneys. The JupiterPaintingcourt said
that its "concern [about an overly expansive attorney-client privilege did] notjustify application of a different privilege to governmental attorney-client relationships." Id. Jupiter
Paintingmerely limited the type of privileged communications; for instance, the attorneyclient privilege would not cover communications from third-party nongovernmental witnesses. See id.This was not an issue before either the Eighth or D.C. Circuits.
168 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 921.
169 In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1109.
170 See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. United States Dep't of Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 252
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that the privilege in the context of government attorneys helps
guarantee quality legal advice to clients "based on a full and frank discussion with [the]
attorney"). In Mead Data the court warned that disclosure of the conversations between
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law should not expect any client, including government employees or
officials, to fully understand the scope of a testimonial privilege before
seeking the advice of counsel. 171 Although government officials frequently have legal backgrounds, 172 the decision to consult with counsel indicates some need for legal assistance. Therefore, the attorneyclient privilege in the grand jury context encourages clients to divulge
173
information they might otherwise not disclose absent the privilege.
In fact, the privilege may be more important in criminal cases than in
civil cases because of the possibility that an adverse verdict may lead to
incarceration. 174
Second, and perhaps most importantly, the privilege in the grand
jury context is consistent with the public interest. 175 As the Supreme
Court noted in Upjohn, "[t]he privilege recognizes that sound legal
advice or advocacy serves public ends."17 6 Any citizen's ability to tailor
attorney and government client to the public would affect government decision-making.
See id. at 256.
171 Cf. Saltzburg, supra note 25, at 608 ("A client is more likely to share information
openly if she knows that a slip of the tongue will not be used against her in court.").
172 See generally MILLER, supra note 3, at 31 ("American lawyers have long dominated
many political offices."). Twenty-five of the 41 United States Presidents, including President Clinton, earned law degrees. See id. Mrs. Clinton is also an attorney. See Greg Pierce,
Inside Politics: Hillarj's Nex4 WASH. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at A9.
173 See Rudolf & Maher, supra note 35, at 41.
174 See Coyle, supra note 15, at Al (arguing that the privilege is more important in
criminal cases than in civil cases); see also Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and FederalRule of
Evidence 501: Privilegeand Vertical Choice of Law, 82 GEo. LJ. 1781, 1832-33 (1994) (arguing
that "protection for attorney-client communications in criminal cases is almost certainly
implicit in the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel"); cf United
States v. Alu, 246 F.2d 29, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1957). The Second Circuit in Alu noted:
[Llawyers representing litigants should not be called as witnesses in
trials involving those litigants if such testimony can be avoided .... [T]his
prohibition is applicable to the United States Government and its attorneys
as well as to private litigants and their attorneys... Especially in criminal
litigation, where so much is at stake for the defendant, must the Bench and
Bar demand adherence to a principle that is designed to ensure objectivity
in the presentation of evidence.
Id.
175 The Eighth and D.C. Circuits placed an absolute value on a government attorney's
need to work in the public interest when they denied the recognition of the government
attorney-client privilege in the grand jury context. See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1109
(D.C. Cir.) ("The obligation of a government lawyer to uphold the public trust reposed in
him or her strongly militates against allowing the client agency to invoke a privilege to
prevent the lawyer from providing evidence of the possible commission of criminal offenses within the government."), affid in part and rev'd in par 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998); In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910,
921 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997). One problem attendant to a decision
about what is and is not in the public interest is the inherent imprecision of the term. See,
e.g., Wang, supra note 1, at 122 (recognizing "the unavoidable difficulties of taking on the
nebulous public interest as a client").
176 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). But see In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 921 ("[Tlhe strong public interest in honest government and in exposing wrongdoing by public officials would be ill-served by recognition of a
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his or her behavior to comply with the law benefits the public. 17 7 This
justification becomes even stronger when that citizen is a government
employee seeking advice about work-related matters. Because one of
the purposes of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage compliance with the law, 178 one cannot argue that privileging government
communications automatically leads to a wrongful government
79
action."
The view of the public interest held by the Eighth and D.C. Circuits ignores the outcome of government decisions and focuses instead on the process of disclosure. This is only one possible method
to evaluate how a government official can act in the public interest.
One alternative to this view is that if a government employee or official is unable to fulfill his or her official duties, the interests of the
public are hurt. 8 0 If one cannot trust that government attorneys will
unflinchingly assist government employees and officials with their duties, the public interest is not adequately served. 18 1 This public interest problem is only magnified when the government official in
question is the President.
Finally, the Eighth and D.C. Circuit opinions misinterpret the
process in which individuals make the decision to consult with counsel. 18 2 Government clients must seek the advice of counsel to determine whether their official actions might bring adverse legal
consequences, be they civil or criminal.' 8 3 This process takes place
governmental attorney-client privilege applicable in criminal proceedings inquiring into
the actions of public officials."); 24 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 134, § 5475, at 29-30
n.14 (Supp. 1999) (quoting id.).
177 See In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 932 (Kopf,J., dissenting).
178
See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
179 The Eighth Circuit mistakenly assumed that government attorneys and clients will
use the privilege only as a "shield" against disclosure, In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 112 F.3d at 921, and did not consider the possibility that the privilege might encourage discussion and disclosure of information among government entities. Because
government clients always have the option to employ private counsel, they can keep damaging information from a tribunal even under the court's rule.
180 See Bruce E. Fein, Promoting the President'sPolicies Through LegalAdvocacy: An Ethical
Imperativeof the Government Attorney, 30 FED. B. NhWs &J. 406, 406 (1983). This rationale is
limited to elected or appointed officials, and not permanent government employees. For a
discussion of a similar perspective on the public interest which uses the Secretary of Education as an example, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks
and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1293, 1294-95 (1987).
181 See Fein, supra note 180, at 406.
182 See Cole, supra note 14, at 27 ("In the real world .. a government official may not
know that he or she has violated the criminal law and, therefore, needs private counsel
until he or she has spoken with an attorney.").
183
Even where a dispute seems to portend only civil liability, the possibility of criminal
proceedings may remain. See Major Richard P. Laverdure, The Threat of Criminal Sanctions
in Civil Matters: An Ethical Morass,ARMY LAw., Jan. 1989, at 16, 17. This concern is magnified in the context of activities by government officials. See Lowell, supra note 13, at A21
("[P]oicy disagreements easily become criminal investigations."); cf. Hunt v. Blackburn,
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regardless of whether a government employee works diligently to
avoid improper conduct, or whether he previously has sought the advice of counsel to avoid illegal conduct.8 4 This type of assistance is
exactly the task government attorneys perform, especially when facing
the issue of disclosure of government information. 8 5 It is only after
consultation with an attorney that a client should be expected to distinguish liability from nonliability and civil liability from criminal
86
liability.'
If the attorney-client privilege is intended to ensure that clients
receive full and effective assistance of counsel, 8 7 then forcing a client
to anticipate all potential legal consequences of his or her actions
before consulting with counsel makes such assistance impossible.' 88
Forcing a government client to seek the advice of private counsel on
all threshold questions regarding the legal consequence of his or her
actions significantly reduces the effectiveness of the assistance of government counsel. Furthermore, a government client now risks having
128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (noting that advice of counsel "can only be safely and readily
availed of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure"). The
consequence of this practical uncertainty is ineffective assistance of counsel. See generally
United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[The attorney-client privilege] provides essential support for the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel.
Without the attorney-client privilege, that right and many other rights belonging to those
accused of crime would in large part be rendered meaningless.").
184
See Lisa E. Toporek, Note, "BadPolitics Makes Bad Law": A Comment on the Eighth
Circuit'sApproach to the Governmental Attorney-Client Privilege,86 GEo. LJ. 2421, 2432 (1998)
("Because at the time of a communication it is unknown whether a subpoena will ultimately be issued, the Eighth Circuit's 'criminal context only' holding makes the existence
of the governmental attorney-client privilege less certain.").
185
SeeJeremy Rabkin, White House Lawyering: Law, Ethics, and PoliticalJudgments,in GovERNMENT LAwYERS, supra note 3, at 107, 116.
186
See Lowell, supra note 13, at A21 ("Officials may not know that the advice they are
seeking has criminal law ramifications ... until they seek it out or it has been rendered.
That is the point of asking a lawyer."); see also Michel Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the
Attorney-Client Privilege:In Search of an IdeologicalReconciliation of Individualism, the Adversary
System, and the Corporate Client's SEC Disclosure Obligations,33 HASmNGs L.J. 495, 508 (1982)
("Uninhibited communication between attorney and client is necessary to ensure that the
client is aware of his or her rights and potential claims .... "); cf. Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) ("[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be
served, the attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of certainty
whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncertain privilege.., is little better
than no privilege at all.").
187
See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
188 See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, _
118 S. Ct. 2081, 2087
(1998) ("[A] client may not know at the time he discloses information to his attorney
whether it will later be relevant to a civil or a criminal matter, let alone whether it will be of
substantial importance."). According to the Upjohn Court, an important benefit of the
attorney-client privilege is that it allows an attorney to examine a series of facts and pick
out those that may have legal consequences. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390-91. But seeJohn
Randall Trahan, Note, A FirstStep Toward Resolution of the PhysicalEvidence Dilemma: State v.
Green, 48 LA. L. REV. 1019, 1046 (1988) (arguing that despite uncertainty surrounding the
scope of the attorney-client privilege, attorneys and clients communicate openly).
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her government attorney called to testify against her merely because
she received an incorrect prediction from private counsel. 8 9 Consider the following situation: A government employee cbnsults with
private counsel, who advises her that some official course of conduct
risks only civil liability. Relying on that advice and the Eighth and
D.C. Circuit holdings, the government client then consults with government counsel on that matter. Subsequently, a grand jury issues a
subpoena seeking to uncover the contents of that conversation. The
client has followed the Eighth and D.C. Circuits' advice to seek private
counsel, but still would be denied the protection of the attorney-client
privilege.
A government employee or official might attempt to solve this
problem by simply seeking the advice of private counsel in regard to
all actions that carry the risk of criminal liability. This resolution becomes complicated where issues of criminal and civil liabilities are difficult to separate. The next section will discuss this issue.
3.

Blending of Criminal and Civil Law

The American legal system traditionally has compartmentalized
legal actions into the categories of criminal law and civil law.' 90 This
distinction encompasses the notion that the goal of civil law is to compensate those harmed by the acts of others, while the goal of criminal
law is to punish those who commit acts which society condemns.' 9'
This division is intrinsic to the Eighth and D.C. Circuits' choice to
distinguish civil matters from criminal matters for the purpose of invoking the government attorney-client privilege. If separate privilege
rules exist for criminal and civil matters, there must be a neat dividing
189 Of course the dilemma for the government employee is even greater than this.
The Eighth and D.C. Circuit opinions are not limited to the disclosure of information by
individuals under investigation by federal grandjuries. The rulings involve access to relevant information for a grand jury proceeding by people who may have that information,
whether they are under investigation themselves or not. Therefore even innocent conversations with counsel by people whom no one suspects of acting improperly are not covered
by the Eighth and D.C. Circuit versions of the government attorney-client privilege.
190 See generally Hicks ex rel Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 636-37 (1988) ("The States
have long been able to plan their own procedures around the traditional distinction between civil and criminal remedies.").
191 See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The MiddlegroundBetween Criminal and
Civil Law, 101 YAE L.J. 1795, 1796 (1992). Mann argues that this distinction is present in
procedural rules, legislative enactments, and legal writings. See id. at 1796-97. The different consequences of a violation of a criminal law and a civil law manifest this distinction.
The consequence of a violation of a criminal statute is punishment and that of a civil
statute is compensation. SeeJosHuA DRssER, UNDERSTANDiNG CRiMiNAL LAw 1 (1987); cf
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 47 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Here
...
the civil/criminal distinction is blurry. Unlike compensatory damages, which are
purely civil in character, punitive damages are, by definition, punishment."); United States
v. Barnette, 129 F.3d 1179, 1182 n.7 (11th Cir. 1997) ("A civil contempt order is compensatory and coercive. A criminal contempt order is punitive." (citation omitted)).
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line between criminal and civil law. Otherwise, a government attorney
could never be comfortable giving advice to clients because she could
never be certain whether such conversations would be privileged. The
Eighth Circuit majority dismissed this practical concern: "An official
who fears he or she may have violated the criminal law and wishes to
speak with an attorney in confidence should speak with a private attorney, not a government attorney."' 92 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit majority argued that "nothing prevents government officials who seek
completely confidential communications with attorneys from consult93
ing personal counsel."'
A clear distinction between criminal and civil law is necessary to
justify both the theoretical and practical distinctions between the at94
torney-client privilege for civil matters and for criminal matters.
Theoretically, courts considering the attorney-client privilege under
either a criminal or civil law rule should provide protection to the
litigants commensurate with the label. Practically, court choice to
provide either civil or criminal law protection should be based on
principle, not on happenstance.
Increasingly, the neat distinction between criminal law and civil
law has blurred. 9 5 This can occur in two ways: First, a single act may
risk either civil or criminal sanction.' 9 6 For example, "[m]atters con-

192
In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
521 U.S. 1005 (1997).
193 In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1112 (D.C. Cir.), affid in part and rev'd in part, 158 F.3d

1263 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 466 (1998).
194 This is not to argue that all constitutional protections afforded to criminal defendants must be given to civil defendants. Nonetheless, if the law mixes civil and criminal
remedies, it should provide adequate protections to civil defendants. See Mary M. Cheh,
ConstitutionalLimits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve CriminalLaw Objectives: Understanding
and Transcending the Ciminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1328 (1991)
("[E]fforts to mix and match criminal and civil sanctions ... undoubtedly will require
procedural and jurisdictional reforms."). Professor Cheh goes on to argue that "certain
proceedings, even though statutorily or judicially labeled 'civil,' in reality exact punishments at least as severe as those authorized by the criminal law." Id. at 1350; see also Mann,
supra note 191, at 1798 ("As civil law becomes more punitive, serious doubt arises about
whether conventional civil procedure is suited for an unconventional civil law.").
195 See Cheh, supra note 194, at 1325 ("[T]he distinction between criminal and civil law
seems to be collapsing across a broad front."); Mann, supra note 191, at 1798 ("[Plunitive
civil sanctions are rapidly expanding, affecting an increasingly large sector of society in
cases brought by private parties as well as by the government ....With more punishment
meted out in civil proceedings, the features distinguishing civil from criminal law become
less clear." (footnotes omitted)); Lowell, supra note 13, at A21 ("[T]he line between the
civil and criminal aspects of a modern government dispute... is nearly invisible .. ").
Mann further notes that "[the paradigmatic co-option of attributes [of criminal and civil
law) stems from historical conventions that are now eclipsed." Mann, supra note 191, at
1804.
196 See Cheh, supra note 194, at 1333-34.

1999]

GOVERNMENT PRIVILEGE

1715

cerning securities, 197 tax, antitrust, fraud or RICO'9 8 laws all could
involve either civil or criminal liability."' 9 9 Second, a court may impose civil sanctions following a criminal conviction. 20 0 Examples of
these sanctions include punitive civil penalties for the filing of false
claims and civil forfeiture of a person's home after drug seizure on his
property.20 1 The first of these two situations is probably the most worrisome for a government client facing a legal arena that does not privilege discussions with government counsel which relate to criminal
matters, but protects discussions concerning civil matters. When a single case contains both criminal and civil elements, one no longer
maintains the dean division of privilege rules in civil and criminal
cases.
While this legal evolution does not mean that the traditional conceptualization of a division of criminal and civil law and the concomitant protections given to criminal and civil litigants20 2 will soon
disappear, it does have several implications for the individual who
must predict whether her actions risk criminal or civil liability. The
seemingly simple answer to this dilemma is that government employees always should assume their actions risk both; therefore, they sim197

Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1994) (imposing criminal penalty for Securities Act viola-

tion), with 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (imposing civil liability for Securities
Act violation).
198 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994) (imposing criminal penalty for RICO violation),
with 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (imposing civil liability for RICO violation).
199 Petitioner's Reply Brief at 9, Swidler & Berlin (No. 97-1192) (footnotes added).
200
Cheh identifies forfeiture and restitution as examples of punitive civil sanctions.
See Cheli, supra note 194, at 1334-35; cf. Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)

(noting that, for doublejeopardy purposes, a punitive purpose may "'transfor[m] what was
clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.'" (quoting Rex Trailor Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)) (alteration in original)); Mann, supra note 191, at
1804 ("[P]unitive sanctions .. . are paradigmatically associated with the criminal law, but
now characterize so much of the civil law that punishment no longer seems a distinctive
attribute of the criminal law.").
201
See Mann, supra note 191, at 1797-98. Cheh uses the example of a legislature choosing punishment as an objective of civil proceedings. See Cheh, supranote 194, at 1356. She
also identifies racial harassment and spousal abuse as matters which might be classified as
criminal, but which are more effectively dealt by civil law processes. See id. at 1326. Kenneth Mann has noted: "[P]unitive civil sanctions.., are sometimes more severely punitive
than the parallel criminal sanctions for the same conduct.... As a result, the jurisprudence of sanctions is experiencing a dramatic shift." Mann, supra note 191, at 1798 (footnote omitted); see also Cheh, supra note 194, at 1356 ("[P]unishment is a common
objective of many civil proceedings."). Cheh also argues that the government tries to effectuate the goals of criminal law with civil sanctions "such as injunctions, forfeitures, restitution, and civil fines." Id. at 1325.
Imposition of punishment also may occur in any civil proceeding if a court holds a
party in contempt. If a party refuses to comply with a court ordr, they may be held in
contempt of court. The punishment for contempt can range from a fine to imprisonment.
See id at 1364-65. Cheh notes that enforcement of the contempt order is conditional, and
that a party can avoid the punishment by complying with the court order. See id. at 1365.
202 See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 139-40 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Hicks ex
rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988).
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ply should consult with private counsel for all legal advice. If this safer
assumption is the default, then the argument made by the Eighth and
D.C. Circuit majorities-that a nonprivilege rule in criminal investigations will not disrupt the flow of legal advice to government employees
and officials2 0 3-is incorrect. The elimination of the attorney-client
privilege in the criminal context will either disrupt the work of government attorneys or alter the type of advice an official such as the
President will receive.
C.

The Attorney-Client Privilege and the President

Thus far, this Note has concentrated on the application of the
attorney-client privilege to all government attorneys in the context of
grand jury inquiries. This section will narrow the focus of this discussion to one particular government official: the President. This section
will examine the precise nature of the attorney-client relationship between the President and White House Counsel and the relevance of
United States v. Nixon.2 0 4 This section will then consider the practical
benefits of the government attorney-client privilege for the President.
1.

The President and Confidentiality

The President is the sole head of the Executive Branch of the
federal government.2 0 5 Article II of the Constitution provides members of the executive branch with some level of secrecy in their communications.2 0 6 This secrecy "ensure [s] that advice to presidents is
203
See In re indsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1112 (D.C. Cir.), affd in part and rev'd inpar 158
F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998); In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
204 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
205
See U.S. CoNsr.art. II, § 1, d. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President

of the United States of America.").
206 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977); United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708. The Court in United States v. Nixon noted:
A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in
a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the
considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of Government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.
Id. One aspect of this secrecy is the ability of the President to consult privately with the
advisors of his choice. SeeAssociation of Am. Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d
898, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The scope and value of this privacy is subject to fierce debate.
Presidential secrecy may hinder Congress's ability to investigate allegations of wrongdoing.
See MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL N. HoFFsAN, Top SECRET: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE
RIGHT To KNow 31 (1977); DAVID WIsE, THE PoLrrcs OF LYrNG: GOVERNMENT DECEPTION,
SECRECY, AND POWER 64 (1973) ("Boiled down, 'executive privilege,' for all of its constitutional trappings, simply means that if a President does not wish to provide information, he
can tell Congress: 'You can't have it.' There is not much Congress can do about it."). For
a sharp criticism of executive branch secrecy, see RAOUL BERGER, ExEcUTVE PRIVILEGE: A
CONs1rrUTIONAL MrH (1974). For an explication of the arguments for and against execu-
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candid and [safeguards] military, diplomatic, and law enforcement
endeavors which premature disclosure would compromise." 20 7 Courts
should presume that those presidential communications which are
necessary to ensure that the President receives quality legal advice are
2 08
protected.
One should undertake with great care any analysis that attempts
to consider the appropriate circumstances in which to limit presidential confidentiality and secrecy. The Eighth and D.C. Circuits restricted the government attorney-client privilege after only a cursory
consideration of general legal principles.20 9 Principles that should be
considered in great detail include the practical needs of the President
and the presidency. 210 Given the President's unique constitutional
position, any restriction on his ability to perform his multiple tasks
2
demands a close examination. 11
The Eighth and D.C. Circuit majorities gave this issue little attention. Although each court acknowledged the importance of the functions performed by the White House, 2 12 they placed absolute values
on fostering "honest government" and on preventing the "gross misuse of public assets." 213 Nonetheless, both courts addressed the arguive secrecy in the context of the executive privilege, see MARKJ.ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECREC' AND DEMOCRATIC ACCoUNTABILTY 8-61 (1994).
207 Randall K Miller, CongressionalInquests: Suffocating the ConstitutionalPrerogative of
Executive Privilege 81 MINN. L. REV. 631, 692 (1997); see also Wang, supra note 1, at 128
("[T]he White House Counsel's legal advice.., enables the President to successfully safeguard the country's vital interest in national security."). Presidential secrecy, though, is not
absolute. For example, the President is not immune from judicial process while in office
for activities he may have undertaken in a private capacity. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S.
681, 693-95 (1997). In addition, the President's personal documents do not receive absolute protection from disclosure. See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711-13.
208 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706, 708.
209
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
210 Cf Mark Miller, Note, A Pivileged Character? The PresidentandJointDefense, 85 GEo.
L.J. 1979, 2002 (1997) (noting that the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon used nonlegal factors including "political exigencies" in its balancing test to determine whether the
executive privilege was applicable); Michael Martin, Attorney-Client PrivilegeforDeceased Client; N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1998, at 3 (noting that the Supreme Court in Swidler & Berlin v.
United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998), applied the instrumentalist approach to the application
of the attorney-client privilege to deceased clients and examined the privilege "only in
terms of its potential to encourage communication between clients and counsel and at the
proposed exceptions or qualifications only in terms of their tendency to discourage such
communication").
211 Cf Clinton, 520 U.S. at 707 (noting in the context of a potential civil suit against the
President while still in office that "[tlhe high respect that is owed to the office of the Chief
Executive, though not justifying a rule of categorical immunity, is a matter that should
inform the conduct of the entire proceeding, including the timing and scope of
discovery").
212
See In reLindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1114 (D.C. Cir.), affid in part and rev'd in par 158
F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998); In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
213 In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 921; see also In re Lindsey, 148
F.3d at 1109-10.

1718

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:1682

ment that elimination of the attorney-client privilege in the grand jury
context effectively eliminates the government attorney-client privilege
in all contexts. The Eighth Circuit responded by arguing that the loss
of the privilege would only occur in those situations which a grand
jury chose to investigate. 2 14 The court further countered that government officials who are concerned that they may have committed a
215
crime should discuss those matters exclusively with private counsel.
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit believed that a reduction of government
employee reliance on government counsel because of the restriction
on the attorney-client privilege is appropriate given the similar limitation on the executive privilege, which protects important matters of
2 16
national security.
These arguments by the Eighth and D.C. Circuits ignore the actual functioning of the White House in both the legal and non-legal
contexts. Only the dissenting opinion ofJudge Tatel on the D.C. Circuit panel recognized the President's unique need for legal advice on
a variety of subjects. The following sections will discuss the President's
need for complete legal advice, beginning with a consideration of
whether the President is the White House Counsel's "client."
2.

Who Is the White House Counsel's Client?

An initial question is whether White House attorneys represent
the individual President or the Office of the President. If White
House lawyers represent the Office of the President rather than the
President himself, the case for privileging the President's communications concerning potentially criminal subject matter becomes substantially weaker. This question is difficult to answer because of "the
amorphous quality of the government."2 1 7 The government lawyer's
potential clients could include the public generally, the government
2 18
as a whole, or the agency that employs the attorney.
214

See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 921.

215

See id.

216 See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1114.
217 Beth Nolan, Removing Conflictsfrom the Administration ofJustice: Conflicts ofInterest and
Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act, 79 GEO. L.J. 1, 39 (1990). See generally
Roger C. Cramton, The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Government Lawyer, 5
GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 291, 296 (1991) (noting that the question of who the client of the
government lawyer is "has vexed decision-makers and commentators for many years").
218 See Nolan, supra note 217, at 39-43. This Note will consider this issue assuming a
post-Independent Counsel legal environment. Because of the language of the former Independent Counsel Statute, the nature of the relationship between the President, the Independent Counsel, and the White House Counsel may have altered the answer to the
question of whether President or the Independent Counsel himself was the holder of the
privilege. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who "Owns" the Government's Attorney-Client Privilege?,
83 MiNN. L. REv. 473, 508 (1998).
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The answer to the initial question that most clearly protects the
President's interests is that the President himself is the "client" of the
White House Counsel's Office. 2 19 If the White House Counsel is not
the functional equivalent of the President's private counsel, the President cannot claim that the White House Counsel has any obligations
to him concerning unofficial matters. But if the White House Counsel's obligations run directly to the President, counsel is "relieve[d]
... of the duty to assess the public interest, or to resolve competing
claims between government agencies, on her own. ' 2 20 It would be unwise to allow White House lawyers to screen each request made by the
President to determine whether the request is consistent with the
221
greater public interest.
This undesirable screening process also would be necessary if a
distinction is drawn between the White House Counsel's obligations
to the President and their obligations to the Office of the President.
For example, the President may encounter a conflict between his issue
agenda and congressional actions that seek to limit presidential
power. If the President chooses to forgo some of his institutional
power for the sake of legislative advances, the White House Counsel
cannot be authorized to oppose such a choice. 2 22 This position is supported by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which note that
government attorneys must maintain the confidences of their clients
219

See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1104 ("In Lindsey's case, his client... would be the

Office of the President."); see also Nolan, supra note 217, at 40 ("If a lawyer is to function
effectively as counselor and adviser to elected and appointed officials, those officials must
not view the lawyer as some independent actor, liable at any time to arrive at some individualistic perception of the 'public interest' and act accordingly." (quoting Report by the District of Columbia BarSpecial Committee on Government Layers and the Model Rules of Professional
Conduc 3 WASH. LAW. 53, 54 (Sept-Oct. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf.
Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("In the governmental context, the
'client' may be the agency and the attorney may be an agency lawyer."); Miller, supra note
180, at 1295 ("Nothing systemic empowers government lawyers to substitute their individual conceptions of the good for the priorities and objectives established through these
governmental processes.").
220 Nolan, supra note 217, at 42. This does not mean that the government attorney has
no responsibility to the public. Because the agency that employs a government lawyer itself
works for the public, a government lawyer's choice to follow the instructions of agency
officials represents an action in the public interest. See id. at 42-43.
221 See Miller, supra note 180, at 1294-95; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Hell, Handbaskets, and Government Lawyers: The Duty of Loyalty and Its Limits, LAw & CoNTEMp. PROBS.,
Winter 1998, at 83, 85 ("The ethics rules of the legal profession ... plainly require an
executive branch attorney to abide by... the policy choices of the legitimately elected
administration in which he or she serves, no matter how strongly the attorney disagree with
those policy choices ....").
222 See Nelson Lund, Layers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 BYU L. REV. 17, 28.
This does not mean that government counsel cannot advise the President to resolve the
dilemma differently. But, if the President chooses to denigrate the office, counsel cannot
forgo assistance to an individual President based on a perceived need to safeguard the
institution of the presidency. See id.
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even if they disagree with the policy positions held by their
223
superiors.
This connection between the White House Counsel and the individual President is buttressed by the fact that the White House Counsel is not statutorily authorized or confirmed by the Senate, and is
relatively isolated from outside inquiry.2 24 Government counsel is still

only counsel; they provide advice. Government attorneys do not have
the final authority to make policy decisions. 225 Therefore, whether
their advice is directed to the President or to the presidency, the
White House Counsel's ability to influence government decisions is
limited by the willingness of policy actors to heed any given advice.
If the President as an individual is considered the client of the
White House Counsel, those lawyers should be able to give privileged
advice to the President about a wide range of issues. This is particularly true when it is difficult to separate privileged actions from non22 6
privileged actions in light of the Eighth and D.C. Circuit rulings.
The next section will consider one key Supreme Court decision in the
area of presidential privileges, United States v. Nixon,2 2 7 and discuss its
relevance to the government attorney-client privilege.
3.

Government Privileges and United States v. Nixon

In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court considered the protections to be given to presidential communications. 228 In Nixon, a
subpoena was directed to President Richard Nixon that sought the
production of tape recordings and documents generated during discussions between Nixon and his advisors.2 2 9 Nixon asserted that production of the tapes could not be compelled because of the
protection provided by the executive privilege.2 30 Although the
Supreme Court recognized the value of secrecy in presidential communications,2 3 ' the Court was unwilling to allow an unqualified privilege encompassing these communications. Instead, the Court
223

See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuar Rule 1.6 cmt. 6 (1998).

224 SeeJeremy Rabkin, At the President'sSide: The Role of the White House Counsel in Constitutional Policy, LAw & CoT-Emep. PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 63, 63-64. The President's ability
to shape the Counsel's Office to his particular needs evidences this connection. See id. at
64. The tailoring of the Office by the President has created an institutional atmosphere
whereby the White House counsel feels close to the President and "dependent on the
president's favor." Id.
225
SeeWang, supra note 1, at 132 ("[T]he lawyer's advice 'can never usurp the decision

which must be made by the responsible head of the agency.'" (citation omitted)).
226 See supra Part III.B.3.
227 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
228
See id. at 703.
229
230
231

See id. at 686.
See id. at 703.

See id. at 705-06.
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balanced the need for government secrecy with the duty of the judiciary "to do justice in criminal progecutions. '23 2 It concluded that a
"generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated,
specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial."233
The central issue in Nixon was the scope of the executive privilege. The executive privilege permits "a presidential administration
23 4
This shielding
... to conduct the duties of government in secret."
of information from the public is distinguishable from the attorneyclient privilege, which protects communications from disclosure to a
court.
Despite the fact that President Nixon never asserted the attorneyclient privilege, the Eighth and D.C. Circuits discussed the Nixon decision. 23 5 Both courts felt that Nixon stood for the proposition that government confidentiality could be "subordinated to the needs of the
23 6
government's own criminal justice processes."
Nixon seems to be at odds with an outright rejection of the government attorney-client privilege in criminal cases. First, the court in
Nixon resolved the case by applying a balancing test to determine
whether, in any particular case, the executive privilege outweighs the
needs of the criminal justice process. 2 37 This balancing presumes that
a privilege (in Nixon, the executive privilege) exists in the first place.
To apply any balancing process, it is necessary to have two or more
relevant factors to balance. This process will not always result in the
complete rejection of one factor in favor of the other, as the Eighth
and D.C. Circuits concluded. 238 Second, one should interpret Nixon
to support the application of the attorney-client privilege to government attorneys. Nixon recognized that privileges should not be created or construed whimsically, and that common law privileges, such
as those involving attorneys, "are designed to protect weighty and legitimate competing interests."23 9 Although Nixon would not recognize an absolute attorney-client privilege, Nixon would favor a
232
233
234

Id. at 707.
Id. at 713.
ROZELL, supranote 206, at 1; see alsoBLACK'S LAw D-rioNARY 569-70 (6th ed. 1990)

(defining executive privilege by its secrecy functions).
235 See In reLindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1114 (D.C. Cir.), affd inpart and rev'd inpart 158
F.d 1263 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 919 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
236 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 919; see In re Lindsey, 148
F.3d at 1114.
237 See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 711-12 ("[W]e must weigh the importance of the general
privilege of confidentiality... against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice.").
238 Nixon also resolved this balance through the use of in camera inspection of documents. See id. at 713-16; see also infra note 268 and accompanying text.
239 Id. at 709.
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balancing of the need for the privilege versus the need for the information sought.
4.

Impact on Advice to the President

The chilling effects of a limitation on the ability of the President
to keep information secret are obvious. 240 At its base, the unfettered
dissemination of information and advice to the President is vital to his
decision-making ability.2 41 As Judge Tatel argued in his dissenting

opinion, "[n] o President can navigate the treacherous waters of postWatergate government, make controversial official legal decisions, decide whether to invoke official privileges, or even know when he
24 2
might need private counsel, without confidential legal advice."

Because the distinction between the President as an individual
and the Office of the President is often blurred,243 a simple distinction between the President's official and unofficial activities is impossible. 244 As a practical matter, White House employees often defend

the private actions of the President. 245 Examples of such defenses in240 See Rudolf & Maher, supranote 35, at 41 ("White House officials who believe that
their discussions with White House counsel are subject to subpoena cannot help but be
chilled in their discussions.. . ."); see also Stanley Brand, A Blow Is Struck Against AttorneyClient Privilegefor Government Lawyers in the Whitewater Independent Counsel Case, FED. LAW.,
June 1997, at 9, 9 ("Given the breadth of the [Eighth Circuit] decision, application of its
holding.., could lead to wholesale disclosure of confidential attorneys' work because so
much of what occurs in the government is or becomes subject to criminal or quasi-criminal
investigations. .. ."); Coyle, supra note 15, at Al ("If government officials were forced to
turn to private counsel at even the hint of criminal implications for certain actions...
they'd not only be foregoing the special expertise of government attorneys, the expense
may mean they'd get no advice at all." (quoting Stephen Saltzburg)).
241 See Miller, supra note 207, at 640.
242 In reLindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1122 (D.C. Cir.) (Tatel,J., dissenting), afl'd in part and

rev'd in part, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998). Judge Tatel also
argued that the use of government counsel, as opposed to private counsel, is in the public's
interest because an uncertain government attorney-client privilege may lead "Presidents to
shift their trust from White House lawyers who have undertaken to serve the Presidency, to
private lawyers who have not." id.
243 See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
244 See Ruth Marcus & Susan Schmidt, LegalExperts Uncertainon Prospectsof ClintonPrivilege Claim, WASH. POsT, Dec. 14, 1995, at A14 ("'[F] or the president, private and public are
not distinct categories... '" quoting New York University law professor Stephen Gillers)).
245 The Restatement of the Law GoverningLawyers uses the example of an allegation of
excessive force by a police officer to demonstrate where the individual government employee and the government organization are each interested in a single case. RESTATEMENT
GOVERNING LAwYERs, supra note 45, § 124 cmt. d. According to the Restatement, the officer may choose between private counsel and government counsel because the interests of
the government are intertwined with the personal difficulties the officer may face. See id.
The Eighth and D.C. Circuits rule denies a privilege in such situations which mix official
and personal interests. If the President faced a criminal investigation for his activities
while in office, then the Eighth and D.C. Circuit rule would contradict the Restatement
rule. This situation was likely in the political environment where special investigations of
official presidential activities proliferated. Five independent counsel investigations were
ongoing as of February 1999. See Editorial, DeathKnell Sounds Againfor Independent Counsels,
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clude the White House press office's answering questions related to
the President's personal life and consideration of the political ramifi246
cations of policy actions by the President's advisors.
This information process may rise to constitutional dimensions,
as "the President requires accurate, frank, and robust advice and information from his subordinates . . . to perform his constitutional

functions." 247 The Framers felt that presidential secrecy and deliberative privileges would enable the President to act quickly and decisively. 248 Without such confidentiality in presidential communica-

tions, performance of the President's constitutional duties would be
far more difficult. 249 As the Court noted in Nixon, presidential privacy
2 50
is in the public interest.
If the President cannot rely on White House Counsel for advice
on all matters, their value as advisors decreases dramatically. 25 1 If the
President constantly fears potential violation of the attorney-client
USA TODAY, Feb. 10, 1999, at 14A. In addition, since the enactment of the Independent
Counsel statute, over 20 independent counsel investigations took place and over $150 million were spent on them. See id. For criticism of the extensive use of the Independent
Counsel and recommendations for change, see Elkan Abramowitz, The Independent Counsek
Instilling Confidence or Cynicismn, N.Y. LJ., Jan. 7, 1997, at 3; Archibald Cox, Editorial, CurbingSpecial Counsels, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 12, 1996, atA37. See generally id. (recommending that
limiting the application of independent counsel can eliminate some of the "overuse[ ] and
...abuse []"). But ef. Samuel Dash, Independent Counsek No More, No Less a FederalProsecutot, 86 GEO. LJ. 2077, 2095 (1998) ("Public disapproval of the independent counsel statute
is not the fault of the statute or any particular independent counsel. Instead, it is the
product of marketing-an image woven largely of public relations and reinforced by the
press."). The recent lapse of the Independent Counsel Statute raises the issue of whether
similar numbers of investigations will occur in the future. See Simon Lazarus, We Can Fix
the Counsel Law, WASH. PosT, June 20, 1999, at BI (discussing alternatives to the Independent Counsel law); Dick Polman, Independent Counsel Law is DyingFriendless,PHILA. INQUIRER,
June 27, 1999, at El (discussing reasons the Independent Counsel law was not
reauthorized); Roberto Suro, As Special Counsel Law Expires, Power Will Shift to Reno, WASH.
Posr, June 30, 1999, at A6 (discussing new regulations concerning special counsels).
246 See Rabkin, supra note 185, at 108.
247 Miller, supranote 207, at 640.
248 See Association of Am. Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898, 909 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) ("If a President cannot deliberate in confidence, it is hard to imagine how he
can decide and act quickly."); THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 472 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize
the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of any
greater number.... .").
249
The President's constitutional duties include compliance with the law. See In re
Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1122 (D.C. Cir.) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that by allowing
the President to be "candid" with his lawyer, "the attorney-client privilege promotes compliance with the law"), affd in part and rev'd in part, 158 F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 466 (1998).
250
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974); see alsoRabkin, supra note 224,
at 98 ("If [the president] wants to play an effective role in the evolution of constitutional
law, he will need to have a sizable and capable White House Counsel's Office.").
251
See Rabkin, supra note 185, at 128 ("[T]he counsel's ability to influence conduct in
the White House depends on his being a trusted presidential loyalist.").
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privilege, he will be less likely to seek advice from White House attorneys on borderline issues. 25 2 This limits the President's ability to effectively shape policy because legal advisors will not feel free to give
potentially unpopular opinions. 253 In addition, the President will not
always have the time to seek the advice of different counsel for different subjects. The President confronts unfamiliar issues daily which
2 54
demand his immediate attention and action.
Even if the President seeks the advice of private counsel on issues
that he senses risk criminal liability, and he is advised that no such risk
exists, there remains no guarantee that future conversations with
White House lawyers about that subject will be privileged. The information, though not obviously relevant to criminal activity, may nonetheless be relevant to a grand jury inquiry of some other government
official. The complexity of the legal system demands that the President be able to consult government counsel to seek advice on how to
comply with the law. 255 Although the President is a "creature [ ] of the
law, and [is] bound to obey it,"256 the President's ability to obey the
257
law depends upon quality legal advice.
Critics argue that if conversations between the President and government lawyers concerning potentially criminal activity are privileged, the President always will have counsel by his side in an attempt
to privilege all conversations.2 58 This criticism represents a misunderstanding of the attorney-client privilege. For a communication to be
privileged, it must be made for the purpose of obtaining legal ad252
See, e.g., id. ("An overly fastidious counsel... risks having White House aides bypass
the counsel's office entirely when they fear that the counsel will raise legal or ethical objections .... ."). But see Nixon, 418 U.S. at 712 ("[We cannot conclude that advisers will be

moved to temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of disclosure
because of the possibility that such conversations will be called for in the context of a
criminal prosecution."). Perhaps if Nixon were decided after the proliferation of Independent Counsel investigations, this conclusion would have been different. See supra
note 245.
253 See Wang, supra note 1, at 134-35.
254 See Bruce Buchanan, Constrained Diversity: The OrganizationalDemands of the Presidency, 20 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 791, 791 (1990). Examples include foreign policy crises,
see id. at 791-92, and intra-staff conflicts, see id. at 792.
255 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950)
(arguing that legal advice is necessary in our society because of its complicated and technical laws).
256 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
257 Government attorneys may be better qualified to help the President avoid criminal
activities than private counsels. Cf Rabkin, supra note 185, at 133 (arguing that for the
President, seeking advice from outside counsel means seeking advice from someone less
familiar with the problems of the White House). The expertise of the White House counsel may even help the President avoid legal difficulties. Professor Rabkin notes that the
White House counsel's office has developed expertise which may help him avoid "the intricate ethical traps established in recent decades." Id.
258

SeeJames A. Barnes, The Clintons Land in a Legal Morass,NAT'LJ., May 31, 1997, at

1098, 1098.
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vice. 259 If a government attorney stands by the President's side as a

personal assistant or a full-time stenographer, those communications
will not be privileged because they were not made for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice. In addition, the rule devised by the Eighth and
D.C. Circuits does not restrict the privilege in the context of conversations between the President and private counsel. Therefore, the ability to hide behind counsel is allowed even within the confines of the
Eighth and D.C. Circuit holdings.
IV
AN ALTERNATrVE TO THE

"No PRIVILEGE" RULE

In Part III, this Note challenged the conclusion drawn by the
Eighth and D.C. Circuits that the attorney-client privilege should not
protect conversations between government employees and government counsel when those discussions become the subject of a federal
grand jury subpoena. This Part will propose an alternative to the
Eighth and D.C. Circuit rule. Because the nuances of the Independent Counsel Statute no longer influence the proper construction of
the government attorney-client privilege, this section will attempt to
fashion a privilege rule that best fosters effective government performance while minimizing opportunities for abuse.
Before proceeding to this proposal, though, it is necessary to
highlight the other alternatives suggested by the dissenting opinions
in the Eighth and D.C. Circuit decisions. 260 Judge Tatel, dissenting
259 Proposed Rule 503 contains this requirement, see supra note 23 and accompanying
text, as do both the Wigmore and Wyzanski definitions of the attorney-client privilege, see
supranote 18 and accompanying text.
260 Five law review articles dedicated exclusively to this topic have been published to
date. The first recommends that the government attorney-client privilege be applied in an
unqualified manner in both civil and criminal proceedings. See Michael K. Forde, The
White House Counsel and Whitewater Government Laugers and the Scope ofPrivileged Communications, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 109, 166-67 (1997). Another favors the balancing approach
recommended by Judge Kopf. See Toporek, supra note 184, at 2439-40. The third recommends that government lawyers advise their clients that conversations may be disclosed if
subject to a federal grand jury subpoena. See Katherine L. Kendall, Note, In re GrandJury
Subpoena Duces Tecum: Destruction of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Government Realm?,

1998 UTAH L. REV. 421, 440. A fourth advocates simply applying the government attorneyclient privilege to official government business, but not to personal matters involving government officials. See Note, Maintaining Confidence in Confidentiality: The Application of the
Attorney-Client Privilege to Government Counse4 112 HiARv. L. REv. 1995, 2004-05 (1999). Finally, the most interesting article written to date on the government attorney-client privilege suggests that because of the peculiarities of the Independent Counsel statute, the
Independent Counsel is the holder of the privilege and "has full authority to contest the
President's (or any other officer's) claim of testimonial or evidentiary privilege." Paulsen,
supra note 218, at 508. Therefore the White House may not refuse to disclose the attorneyclient communications because it does not control the use of the government privilege. See
id. Paulsen's conclusions depend on the provisions of the former Independent Counsel
Statute, not on any broader theory about the proper scope of the government attorneyclient privilege.
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from the D.C. Circuit opinion, did not outline a solution to the question, but suggested that a complete factual record must be established
before any legal rule could be fashioned. 26 1 On the other hand,
Judge Kopf, dissenting from the Eighth Circuit opinion, believed that
the balancing test devised in United States v. Nixon for the executive
privilege should be extended to the government attorney-client privilege. 262 Although such balancing does not adequately protect the val-

ues upheld by the attorney-client privilege, 263 it is a useful starting
point for the discussion of an alternative to the Eighth and D.C. Circuit rule.
A. Judge Kopf's Balance
In his dissent from the Eighth Circuit's decision, Judge Kopf cited
Nixon for the proposition that "presidential confidentiality [should]
be afforded the greatest possible protection." 264 He argued that
Nixon's balancing test-weighing executive confidentiality against the
public interest-should apply to the government attorney-client privilege.2 65 This process would include (1) a preliminary showing of the

need,2 66 relevance, and admissibility of the subpoenaed information
by the government, 267 (2) in camera inspection of documents, 268 and
(3) the court's balancing of the need for confidentiality against the
269
public interest in the disclosure of the information.
Judge Kopf acknowledged that a balance of interests creates uncertainty because government officials can only find out which conversations are privileged after a court has undertaken this balancing
process. 270 Nevertheless, he was unwilling to conclusively elevate the
White House's interest in confidentiality over the court's interest in
271
developing a complete factual record.
261
See In re Lndsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1123 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 158
F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.) (Tatel, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct 466 (1998).
262 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 935-36 (8th Cir. 1997)
(Kopf, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
263 See infra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
264 In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 935 (Kopf, J., dissenting).
265 See id. at 936 (Kopf, J., dissenting). Judge Kopf did not discuss the analogy between
the executive privilege claim in Nixon and the attorney-client privilege claim in In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum See id. Rather, by characterizing Nixon as addressing "the President's general need for confidentiality," Judge Kopf concluded that the attorney-client
privilege falls within its holding "[a]t this elevated level of abstraction." Id.
266
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713-14 (1974).
267 See id. at 700-02.
268
269
270
271

See id at 713-16.
See id.at 711-12.
See In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d at 936 (Kopf,J., dissenting).
See id. (Kopf,J., dissenting).
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The Merits and Demerits of Balancing Privileges

The use of balancing to determine whether a privilege should
protect particular communications is quite common. To overcome
the presumption that evidence must be disclosed to a court,2 72 courts
often undertake a balancing of interests approach. 2 73 Balancing allows a court to examine whether the need to keep information confi274
dential outweighs the value of the disclosure of that information.
But balancing privileges is problematic. Privileges should be categorical. They should apply when certain threshold conditions are
275
met, regardless of the other side's need for the information sought.
A client should know when she speaks with counsel whether the conversation is privileged. A court's later need for that information
should not trigger a restriction on the privilege. Additionally, balancing creates uncertainty.2 7 6 If a court balances the need of the judicial
process with the need of the client after the client already has disclosed the information to her attorney, the attorney-client privilege is
2 77
of little benefit.
C. An Alternative: Threshold Questions for Courts
The question remains: how can courts craft a predictable rule for
the government attorney-client privilege that minimizes abuse by government clients? The optimal privilege rule is one which lawyers and
clients can discern at the time they wish to communicate, but is not so
expansive as to protect information to which the government or court
legitimately should have access.
272
273

See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., EpsTN, supra note 27, at 14 ("Implicit in many of the cases is a balancing

of social goals."). This balancing involves "the need for full disclosure" on the one hand
and "the desirability of protecting confidentiality and encouraging attorney-client communications" on the other. H
274
See Rosenfeld, supra note 186, at 496 (noting that the attorney-client privilege embodies "the tension between the rights of the individual and the good of society"). Rosenfeld adds that "it]he adversary system ofjustice is committed to individual rights and fair
procedures, on the one hand, and to discovery of the truth, on the other." Id275 Most courts have adopted this view. See 1 SToNE & TAYLOR, supranote 19, § 1.01, at
1-6 & n.10. When a court seeks to determine whether the attorney-client privilege applies
in an individual case, no attempt is made to balance interests. SeeJonathan P. Rich, Note,
The Attorney-Client Privilege in CongressionalInvestigations,88 COLUM. L. REv. 145, 161 n.113
(1988).
276 See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, _
118 S. Ct. 2081, 2087
(1998) ("Balancing ex post the importance of the information against client interests, even
limited to criminal cases, introduces substantial uncertainty into the privilege's application."); 1 SToNE & TAYLOR, supra note 19, § 1.01, at 1-5 to 1-6.
277 See Toporek, supra note 184, at 2434 (noting that, as a result of the Eighth Circuit's
decision, "Iflor the first time, whether or not the privilege stands depends on the type of
subsequent inquiry being made into the conversation not the conditions present at the
time of the conversation").
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This section will identify the only two situations in which courts
should refuse to recognize the government attorney-client privilege. 278 The basic test that these situations represent is the following:
the government attorney-client privilege should not protect discussions between government counsel and government clients concerning the clients' purely private conduct. Furthermore, even when the
discussions concern official government business, the privilege should
not apply if the substance of the discussion relates to an ongoing criminal investigation or to a matter which the client should reasonably
anticipate may be the subject of a future criminal investigation. The
following sections will discuss these two prongs-the public-versus-private prong and the present-versus-future prong-separately.
1. Public Matters Versus Private Matters
The first issue courts should consider is whether the conduct at
issue constitutes official or private conduct. If a conversation between
the government attorney and government client involves the private
behavior of the client, then the government attorney-client privilege
should not protect the discussion for disclosure.27 9 This rule is predictable. 280 To comply with the rule, government employees would
merely have to seek private counsel for private matters, and could
choose between government counsel or private counsel for official
matters. 2 8 ' The rule also minimizes abuse by government employees
who, under the rule of absolute privilege, may seek the (free) advice
of government attorneys about private matters.
This distinction between the public and private activities of government employees follows the logic of the Eighth and D.C. Circuit
majorities, but does little violence to the government attorney-client
privilege itself. These courts had two central concerns about the rec278 These two situations supplement the requirements of the definition of the attorney-client privilege and the standard exceptions to the privilege. Those exceptions, contained in Proposed Rule 503, are discussed supra at notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
279
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir.) (noting
that the use of government attorneys in "a federal criminal investigation would represent a
gross misuse of public assets"), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997).
280 Predictability is a virtue in any area of law. See, e.g., Scott Fruehwald, A Multilateralist Method of Choice of Law, 85 Ky. LJ. 347, 371 (1996-1997) ("Any choice of law system
should be predictable."); Edward Kessel & Lisa Brown Petkun, Are Crummey Withdrawal
Rights Still a Viable Estate Planning Tool?, 85 J. TAx'N 146, 150 (1996) (noting "the need to

create certainty and predictability in the tax laws"); Note, Class Certificationin Mass Accident
Cases UnderRule 23(b)(1), 96 HARv. L. REv. 1143, 1154 (1983) ("Two goals of tort law should
be predictability and uniformity.").
281 The rule does not help distinguish much of the activity of the President, because it
is difficult to separate private from public behavior of the President. See supranotes 244-47
and accompanying text. Nonetheless, this rule may influence a President's choice to speak
to White House or private counsel on a certain issue that he feels is clearly public or clearly
private.
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ognition of the government attorney-client privilege in the grand jury
setting: (1) abuse of public assets and public trust,28 2 and (2) the gov2 83
ernment attorney's obligation to expose government wrongdoing.
The public-versus-private distinction satisfies both concerns. A government employee has no obligation to expose wrongdoing when the
problem for which he or she seeks legal advice concerns private, not
public, behavior. 284 It is, though, a misuse of public finances for government employees to use government counsel for private legal
matters.
2.

Foreseeability of CriminalRamifications

Even if the conduct at issue is official government business, the
government attorney-client privilege should not protect conversations
between government employees and government counsel when those
discussions are reasonably related to (1) an ongoing criminal investigation (whether the client is the focus of the investigation or merely
has information reasonably related to an ongoing investigation), or
28 5
(2) criminal activities that are not currently under investigation.
Exempted from this rule are cases where no investigation is ongoing
and the government client cannot reasonably anticipate that the conversation would be linked to any future criminal investigation. This
rule differs from the positions of the Eighth and D.C. Circuit majorities by requiring either an ongoing investigation or a reasonable belief
by the client that the discussion is related to criminal activity.
282 See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1109 (D.C. Cir.), affd in part and rev'd in par4 158
F.3d 1263 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998); In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces
Tecum, 112 F.3d at 921.
283 See In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1102.
284 In their private lives, public employees maintain all the rights that private citizens
enjoy. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1015 (1985) (Brennan,J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("[P]ublic employees maintain, no less than all other
citizens, a fundamental constitutional right to make 'private choices involving family life
and personal autonomy.'" (quoting Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 971 (1983)
(Brennan,J., dissenting from denial of certiorari))); Swope v. Bratton, 541 F. Supp. 99, 109
(W.D. Ark. 1982) ("[Piublic officers are entitled to a private life free from intrusion.");
Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58, 67 (D. Md. 1970) (reasoning that a public employee's
private life is of no concern to the government employer unless it affects his job performance). This personal autonomy also applies to the President. SeeNixon v. Administrator of
Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977) ("[P]ublic officials, including the President, are not
wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of personal life unrelated to any acts done by them in their public capacity.").
285 Courts apply the reasonable belief standard in many other areas of the law. See, e.g.,
United States v. Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 776 (4th Cir. 1998) (applying probable cause inquiry
to the question of whether sufficient evidence exists to form a reasonable belief that a
crime has been committed); United States v. Two Parcels of Real Property Located in Russell County, Ala., 92 F.3d 1123, 1126-27 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying reasonable belief standard in a drug forfeiture proceeding); Austin v. Healey, 5 F.3d 598, 605 (2d Cir. 1993)
(applying reasonable belief standard to an extradition proceeding).
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Nonetheless, this rule is consistent with the logic of the Eighth
and D.C. Circuit majorities, and at the same time maintains the beneficial protections that the government attorney-client privilege offers.
Both circuits feared that an absolute privilege would allow government attorneys to shield criminal behavior and damage the public interest. 28 6 But a rule that prohibits government employees from

discussion with government counsel about ongoing investigations, or
about subjects reasonably related to criminal activity, adequately protects the public interest. It also prevents government clients from being broadsided by grand jury subpoenas. Additionally, this rule will
not stifle communications between government employees and government counsel if the employees have no reason to believe that the
matters for which they seek legal advice carry criminal implications.
Finally, this rule accounts for the difficulties individuals face in antici28 7
pating the difference between criminal and civil liability.

This present-versus-future prong is objective and easy to follow. If
a criminal investigation is ongoing and a government employee has
evidence related to that investigation, he may not discuss the matter
with government counsel. Similarly, the focus on the reasonable anticipation of a future criminal investigation also provides an objective
test.28 8 It not only gives predictability to the privilege, but also fosters

the exposure of wrongdoing by the government. This reasonableness
standard is consistent with the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which
permits government employees to disclose certain information if they
reasonably believe that it demonstrates wrongdoing by government
employees or officials. 289 If a court is able to determine whether the
shielding of the information by a government employee was reasonable, then concerns about widespread nondisclosure of information
critical to criminal investigations would be diminished. 290 This en286
See In reLindsey, 148 F.3d at 1109-10; In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112
F.3d at 921.
287
See supra Part III.B.3.
288
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (identifying as an objective test a
reasonable belief standard under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Han, 74 F.3d
537, 541 (4th Cir. 1996) (noting that a reasonable belief standard for probable cause is an
objective test); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985)
(using a reasonable belief of competent attorney as an objective standard in investigating
viability of a pleading). See generallyMathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 635 (3d
Cir. 1996) (noting that Congress's use of words "reasonable belief" in a statute shows an
intent to create an objective standard).
289
See Cramton, supra note 217, at 307-09. It is unclear whether this statute permits
disclosure by government attorneys of presumptively privileged information. Nonetheless,
no government lawyer has yet disclosed information under the Act, presumably out of an
obligation to keep the confidences of their clients. See id. at 315.
290
See K. A. McNeely-Johnson, Note, United States v. Nixon, Twenty Years After The
Good, theBad and the Ugly-An Exploration ofExecutive Privilege,14 N. Iu. U. L. Rxv. 251, 29798 (1993) (noting that the use of procedural safeguards described in United States v. Nixon,
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sures the predictive value of the attorney-client privilege while satisfying the Eighth and D.C. Circuit concerns about, misuse of public
assets.
CONCLUSION

Two federal appeals courts recently held that the government
attorney-client privilege does not protect communications between
government employees and government attorneys once those conversations become the subject of a federal grand jury subpoena.
Although the decisions establish a roadmap for government employees who wish to speak to government counsel about potentially criminal matters, 29 1 the holdings force government attorneys to work in a
conversational minefield, where any discussion potentially may be sub2 92
ject to disclosure to a grand jury.
The decisions also muddy the waters for the government attorney-client privilege outside the criminal context.2 93

Commentators

have already begun to fear the future erosion of the government attorney-client privilege. Some feel these decisions might cause "Congress,
criminal defendants, state prosecutors and civil litigants [to] demand
the right to seek [formerly privileged] materials in the face of such a
weak privilege." 294 If, as both circuits held, conversations between
including in camera inspection of documents, would help to prevent abuse of the disclosure process).
291 See Cole, supranote 14, at 26 ("[G]overnment lawyers should establish a procedure
for identifying and reporting to senior attorneys any legal matters that involve a grand jury
investigation or other criminal inquiry.").
292 See Toporek, supranote 184, at 2436 ("Instead of trying to guess whether a particular conversation will be successfully subpoenaed in a current or future criminal investigation, government officials will follow a better-safe-than-sorry approach and act as if there is
no governmental attorney-client privilege at all."); Berkman, supra note 10, at A12 ("'We
tell [government employees] that they cannot rely on the confidentiality of most of their
discussions [with lawyers] within their agencies.'") (quoting Washington lawyer G. Jerry
Shaw)); see also Captain Anders, Clinton PrivilegeDecision Provides Timely Reminderfor Commanders and Managers, ARMY LAW., Sept. 1997, at 54, 55 (suggesting that judge advocates
should discuss In re GrandJury Subpoena Duces Tecum with commanders and explain the
limits of government attorney confidentiality).
293 See Cole, supra note 14, at 15 ("[T]he unexpected denial of certiorari has left many
government attorneys questioning whether and to what extent the Eighth Circuit opinion
may affect them and their governmental clients."). Cole argues that some of the scenarios
which justify the restriction of the government attorney-client privilege at the federal level
may not apply to state and local governments. The White House lawyers' enhanced duty to
disclose may not be equally applicable to state or local governments. In addition, he argues that the government attorney-client privilege should be available to the state or local
government that is the subject of a federal investigation. See id.
at 19-20. However, state
courts may adopt the Eighth or D.C. Circuits' reasoning when faced with state or local
governments subject to a state grand jury subpoena. See id. at 26.
294 Coyle, supra note 15, at Al (stating the contentions of White House Counsel
Charles F.C. Ruff and a special counsel to President Clinton, Andrew L. Frey); see id.("'Be
prepared to see [the 8th Circuit's ruling] flower because of the number and breadth of
government investigations that become criminal.'" (quoting Washington lawyer Stanley
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government attorneys and government clients about potentially improper conduct constitute wrongful government conduct, then this
equation exists regardless of whether the improprieties are of a civil or
2 95
a criminal nature.
A more reasonable government attorney-client privilege rule
would recognize and resolve the practical problems facing government attorneys and clients under a limited and uncertain privilege.
The rule proposed by this Note would exclude from the government
attorney-client privilege only those conversations related to personal
issues, ongoing criminal investigations, or clearly criminal activity.

Brand) (alteration in original)); Rudolf & Maher, supra note 35, at 40 (arguing that "[ifn
an age of ever-present special prosecutors examining various alleged misdeeds, this impact
may be of great consequence"). The next threat to the government attorney-client privilege may occur in civil litigation. See Brand, supra note 240, at 9; cf Louis S. Raveson,
Unmasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers: A Subpoenafor Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 879, 933-34 n.358 (1985) (discussing the application of Nixon by several lower federal
courts in the context of disclosure of information in civil suits). Professor Raveson notes
that "several lower courts... have determined that the privilege can be overcome in civil
suits, under some circumstances." Id.
295 See Brand, supranote 240, at 10 ("Is it any less a 'misuse of public assets' to allow the
government to use its in-house attorneys to shield relevant discovery in a civil suit involving
a plaintiff's suit for breach of contract or civil rights violations?").

